When Security Guarantees Become a Bargaining Chip

The US sees its offer of "article-5 like" security guarantees as a bargaining chip. That undercuts their credibility.

European leaders gather with US negotiators in Berlin, December 15, 2025. Photo courtesy of President Zelenskyy / X.com

For the past two days in Berlin, the United States has sought to negotiate a framework agreement for ending the war in Ukraine with the leaders of Ukraine and the major European nations. Among the most important sticking points towards an agreement were two issues: territory and security guarantees.

By Monday evening, President Zelenskyy, Germany Chancellor Merz, and US negotiators indicated that “real progress" had been made. Though the territorial issue remained unresolved, there was movement on the critical issue of security guarantees. On Sunday, Zelenskyy had indicated that Ukraine would no longer seek membership in NATO as a condition for signing an agreement. That was a major concession, which both Russia and the United States had sought. But the Ukrainian leader insisted that Ukraine receive “robust security guarantees” on a par of NATO’s article 5 (which regards an armed attack against one member as an armed attack against all). He also made clear that those guarantees would need to be legally binding and approved by the US Congress.

According to German, Ukrainian, and US sources, Washington is now willing to provide such guarantees. While the precise details are not yet known, a US officials described the agreement as “basically to have really, really strong guarantees – Article Five-like – also a very, very strong deterrence” in the size of Ukraine’s military (which Ukraine earlier agreed to cap at 800,000). “What’s on the table is really the platinum standard for what can be offered. It would have to go before the Senate, and President Trump is willing to do that,” the FT quoted another US official as saying.

According to Merz, Europeans countries would be willing to provide the same guarantees. In addition, a European-led multinational force would be deployed in Ukraine to enforce a potential peace agreement. That force would also be supported by the United States, presumably with intelligence and other support.

Security Guarantees are Key

From the very first discussions on how Russia’s war in Ukraine might end, the question of security guarantees has stood central. Ukraine’s willingness to end the war short of regaining all the territory it has lost to Russia was possible only if the remaining territory would be secure. While Ukraine’s territorial integrity would have been breached, its sovereignty and independence would require real, binding guarantees that any resumption of war by Russia would inevitably involve European and American military forces on Ukraine’s side. Only the prospect of war with NATO countries would deter Moscow from resuming the war.

But security guarantees aren’t solely in the interest of Ukraine. They’re critical for Europe’s security as well. An end to the war that ensures Ukraine’s sovereignty and political independence, and that sees Ukraine joining the European Union represents a profound defeat for Russia. After all, Moscow decided to go to war against Ukraine in 2014 precisely to undermine Kyiv’s sovereignty and deny its association with (let alone membership in) the European Union.

Therefore, robust, legally binding security guarantees similar to that in NATO’s article 5 not only provide a strong deterrent but is critical to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and European security. There can be no peace in Europe without strong security guarantees for Ukraine.

And, yet, that’s not how Washington sees these guarantees. For Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, the two negotiators in Berlin these past two days, and no doubt for President Trump himself, security guarantees are bargaining chips to get Ukraine to sign up to the agreement they think will bring an end to the war.¹ Why else declare, as one senior US official did after explaining what Washington had offered, that “those guarantees will not be on the table forever. Those guarantees are on the table right now if there’s a conclusion that’s reached in a good way.”

But to be real, robust, and resilient, security guarantees have to be based on an assessment that the security being guaranteed is fundamental to one’s own security. The 32 members of NATO see Article 5 as absolutely core to their national security. To treat a security guarantee as a bargaining chip is to signal that the guarantees themselves aren’t real. A nation doesn’t bargain away the decision to go to war on a whim. Nor should any serious nation ever offer a security guarantee it is not willing to implement. To suggest otherwise is to call into question the very idea of a security guarantee—in this case, not just to Ukraine but to the 55 other allies that the US has committed to defend.

War and peace are serious business. And security guarantees are central to whether war or peace will prevail. They can’t be treated as bargaining chips. Doing so will make war more, not less likely.

1. For reasons I explained the other day, Trump, Witkoff, and Kushner are fooling themselves if they think an agreement reached with Ukraine and the Europeans will be accepted by Putin. Precisely because security guarantees are critical to Ukraine and Europe, these guarantees will prove unacceptable to a Russia that wants to deny Ukraine’s sovereignty and undermine Europe’s security.