I joined CNN earlier today to discuss the latest twist in the Iran negotiations: Tehran’s reported bid to gain authority over the Strait of Hormuz — and President Trump’s flat rejection of it.
Trump was characteristically blunt: the Strait is international waters, nobody controls it, and we’ll “watch over it.” That sounds reassuring. The reality is more troubling.
Iran Already Controls the Strait
Here’s the hard truth: Iran has effectively controlled traffic through the Strait of Hormuz since it closed it on February 28th, at the outset of the war. Geography is destiny — Iran sits right along the Strait and has the capacity to attack shipping through it. Short of a U.S. military occupation of large parts of Iran, that isn’t going to change. The president can declare the waters international all he wants. The Iranians have a different idea, and so far they have been able to dictate the terms.
The Nuclear Question
On the nuclear front, things are no better. All reporting suggests the memorandum currently being negotiated doesn’t seriously address Iran’s nuclear program — at best it lays down vague parameters for a future negotiation. Secretary Rubio was right when he said you can’t negotiate the end of an Iranian nuclear program in 72 hours on the back of a napkin. It took the Obama administration 16 months. It took the Europeans a decade of negotiations, from 2003 to the final agreement in 2015.
And then Trump walked away from that agreement.
That was strategic folly: if the JCPOA had remained in force, Iran today would have no more than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67%. Instead, Iran now has roughly 8,500 kilograms of enriched uranium — some enriched to 60%, some to 20% — enough material, if given time, to potentially build not 1 bomb but closer to 100.
“They Weren’t Complying”? The Record Says Otherwise.
Trump’s standing defense is that Iran wasn’t serious about the deal and would have had a nuclear weapon by now if he hadn’t pulled out. The record simply doesn’t support that. Until the day the United States withdrew, Iran was abiding by the terms of the JCPOA — no serious analyst disputed that at the time.
Yes, the agreement had sunset provisions. Yes, a follow-on negotiation would eventually have been needed. But Trump had years to pursue a better deal from a position of strength, with Iran constrained. Instead, he chose confrontation — and in doing so, gave Iran every reason to conclude that the only real deterrent against American or Israeli military action is a nuclear weapon.
We are not better off. We are substantially worse off. And the window to fix it is narrowing fast.
