Thanks to everyone who joined our first live Ask Ivo session. The questions were sharp, the conversation ranged wide, and I want to capture the three things I think matter most from our discussion.
The Iran “deal” is a do-over — at a much higher cost
The 14-point framework now circulating — reported by Barak Ravid at Axios — looks remarkably familiar. A moratorium on uranium enrichment, enhanced IAEA inspections including snap visits, removal of enriched uranium from Iranian territory, gradual sanctions relief. If that sounds like the 2015 JCPOA, it’s because it essentially is.
The uncomfortable truth is this: we fought a war to get back to an agreement that was already in place. And we are not returning to the same starting point. When Trump walked away from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran had a breakout time of roughly one year — the time it would take to enrich enough material for a single nuclear weapon. Today, Iran sits on an estimated 11 tons of enriched uranium, including significant stockpiles at 60-percent purity. The breakout timeline is now measured in weeks, not a year. And the material its has, by some estimates, is sufficient for roughly 100 nuclear weapons.
The military infrastructure has been degraded. The missile program and proxy networks have suffered. We’ve seen enormous destruction. But I’m not yet convinced we are in a better place than we were in 2018.
A stronger European NATO — but don’t use it as an exit ramp
Trump’s pressure on NATO allies is producing real results. European defense spending is up, and European governments are acquiring capabilities they have long deferred. Fear is a powerful motivator, and the fear that the United States might not be there is, ironically, pushing Europe to do what decades of American urging could not.
I support a more European NATO. A rebalancing of responsibilities — with Europe taking the lead on its own defense while the United States remains engaged — would ultimately strengthen the alliance and serve American security interests. The lesson of two world wars is that European security and American security are inseparable.
What I worry about is the next move: Washington concluding that because Europe is stronger, America can simply go home. That logic is seductive and wrong. A U.S. withdrawal — even a partial one from the integrated command structure — would hollow out the alliance at exactly the moment it is most needed. Strengthening the European pillar should be the beginning of a conversation about shared leadership, not the pretext for an American exit.
A cornered Putin is a dangerous Putin
Ukraine’s drone revolution is changing the battlefield in ways that matter. Russian casualties are running at roughly 35,000 dead and wounded per month. Ukrainian long-range drones and cruise missiles are reaching Moscow. The war is going better for Ukraine than at any point in recent memory.
And yet I left our conversation more worried, not less.
Vladimir Putin is a man who spent months in COVID isolation rather than risk exposure. He does not fold easily. Faced with a choice between retreat and escalation, history suggests he will escalate. The question is what form that escalation takes — and whether the United States will communicate clearly, as it did in October 2022, what the consequences would be. I am not confident it will.
A paranoid leader, a military that is being ground down, an economy that remains stuck despite rising energy revenues — this is the profile of someone who may lash out rather than accept defeat. I hope I am wrong. But this is precisely the moment for sober deterrence, not diplomatic ambiguity.
Ask Ivo returns on the first Wednesday of every month. Subscribe to America Abroad on Substack, and catch my weekly conversation on World Review — available on all major podcast platforms and, for Chicago listeners, on WBEZ Sunday mornings at 7am.
