Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the Trump administration’s escalating pressure on Cuba, the fallout for Taiwan from the Beijing summit, and the political crisis engulfing Keir Starmer’s Labour government in Britain. Joining me this week were Karen DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior National Security Correspondent at the Washington Post; Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor of The Economist; and Philip Stephens, Contributing Editor of the Financial Times and author of the Inside Out newsletter.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion.

Cuba: The Thirteenth President Tries Again

The Trump administration’s escalating pressure on Cuba — oil embargo, expanded sanctions, and nowcharging former president Raúl Castro with the 1996 shoot-down of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft — raised the central question Karen had been tracking for decades: is this time actually different? Her answer: Trump genuinely believes this time is different, that he has a political constituency in southern Florida that demands it, a Secretary of State in Marco Rubio who has staked his career on it, and a Venezuela precedent he thinks he can replicate. But Cuba is not Venezuela. It is not one man at the top of a brittle personalist regime — it is a tightly integrated Communist Party-military apparatus that, as Karen put it, “will fight back.” Anton laid out the strategic logic the White House appears to be working from: the Venezuela model was meant to be a third way between full-scale invasion and a few cruise missiles, a targeted decapitation followed by a compliant successor government — and that logic led them badly astray in Iran, which hardened rather than collapsed. Cuba, he suggested, poses similar risks of a protracted conflict at a moment when the U.S. is already deeply extended. Philip placed the whole enterprise in a wider frame: Venezuela, Cuba, Iran — taken together, these represent something he called “belligerent unilateralism,” a United States that has effectively left the West it created and led and is now simply acting on presidential preference wherever American power can be brought to bear. The Europeans, he noted, think the Cuba policy is “profoundly wrong” — but with Iran on their plate, and Greenland, and NATO, they have decided not to fight this one.

Taiwan: The Supplicant’s Return

Coming out of the Beijing summit, Trump did not merely fail to reassure Taiwan — he appeared, in Anton’s phrase, to have come out “at the more worrying end” of the range of possibilities anyone had anticipated. The litany was striking: Trump called arms sales a “bargaining chip,” echoed Beijing’s language about reunification, suggested Taiwan had “stolen” America’s semiconductor industry, and — pointedly reversing the Biden pattern of insisting the US would defend Taiwan, volunteered unprompted that Taiwan is 9,500 miles from the U.S. and only a few hundred from China, implying it was not a fight he wanted. Beijing’s denial of entry to Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby ahead of a planned Hegseth visit — on the explicit condition that Washington first say no to the pending arms sale to Taiwan — illustrated how thoroughly Beijing had internalized the president’s own framing. Karen observed that Republican China hawks on the Hill will be furious, but that Trump’s hold on the party makes it essentially impossible for Congress to compel a different course; and Anton added a critical military dimension: the Iran campaign has consumed significant stocks of the long-range interceptors and precision munitions that any credible Taiwan contingency would require. Philip summed up the summit’s deeper meaning with characteristic directness: watching the body language, Xi was the man in command, Trump was responding to his initiatives, and the logic of Trump’s own worldview — if America gets to run its hemisphere, why can’t China run its neighborhood? — points in only one direction. This summit may come to be seen as the moment the United States arrived in Beijing for the first time not as the demandeur of the relationship, but as the supplicant — with Xi framing not only the future relationship as on of “constructive strategic stability, but making clear that he would be determining what counted as strategic, stable, and constructive.

Britain: A Comedy of Errors Turned Farce

Keir Starmer arrived in office less than two years ago with a parliamentary majority of over 170 seats — a margin that, under normal assumptions, should have guaranteed a decade in power. Philip, who has watched British politics for forty years, called what has happened since genuinely the most inexplicable moment in that long career. Labour is haemorrhaging support in two directions simultaneously: to Nigel Farage’s Reform on the right, which has done to Labour’s blue-collar base in the deindustrialised Midlands and North what Trump did to Democrats, and to the Greens on the left, which have evolved from an environmentalist party into something closer to a far-left economic force. Starmer himself, Philip argued, is less the cause than the symptom — a poor communicator lacking the emotional intelligence modern politics demands, brought down by unforced errors that are not, in themselves, capital crimes, but which a more gifted politician would not have made. The succession is, if anything, more troubling than the crisis: Andy Burnham, the Manchester mayor and frontrunner, must first win a by-election that Farage’s Reform will contest hard; Wes Streeting is the most impressive figure in the field but mishandled his cabinet resignation and lacks the party base; Ed Miliband may emerge as the compromise candidate if Burnham stumbles. None of them, as Philip put it, has a prospectus that offers Labour a way out — none is proposing to rebuild the coalition between metropolitan progressives and working-class traditionalists that Tony Blair assembled so brilliantly and that has since come apart. Anton noted that Europe has quietly re-entered the conversation — buyer’s remorse over Brexit is now a majority position in polling, and Starmer himself has gestured toward closer alignment, driven partly by the rupture with Washington. But he was skeptical it would move quickly enough to matter, given that a fresh referendum would be required and the issue still divides Labour’s own coalition. Karen drew the parallel that was in the room all along: a centre-left party that knows what it has lost but cannot agree on what to become next — a description, she noted, that fits the Democratic Party just as well.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the Xi-Trump Summit, Russia’s growing troubles, and the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz. Joining me this week were Carla Anne Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former Deputy Editorial Page Editor of the New York Times; Jamil Anderlini, Regional Director for Europe at Politico and former Beijing bureau chief for the Financial Times; and Yannis Palaiologos, Correspondent at Large for Kathimerini and “Inside Story.”

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion.

The Beijing Summit: Theater Over Substance

Whatever else one says about the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing this week, it was above all a masterclass in Chinese political theater — and the United States played its assigned role. Jamil, who spent more than two decades reporting from China, put it plainly: the most significant aspect of the meeting was not what was agreed but the optics of an American president arriving in a posture of what he called “obeisance,” creating an unmistakable image, for Asian audiences in particular, of Xi Jinping receiving tribute rather than hosting a peer. “It really showed a shift,” Jamil said. “One of them, which has always been a little less powerful, looks more powerful — not than the United States yet, but more powerful than it did vis-à-vis the United States.” Carla added a substantive manifestation of this shift — Trump signaling a willingness to discuss Taiwan arms sales with the Chinese. On Air Force One on the way home, he confirmed the two leaders had talked about the pending $14 billion weapons deal “in great detail” — raising the alarming possibility that he offered Beijing something close to veto power over US arms sales to Taiwan, a concession Ronald Reagan had explicitly ruled out the so-called “Six Assurances” to Taiwan in 1982. Trump’s dismissal of that commitment — “1982 is such a long time ago” — captured a presidency willing to trade away hard-won strategic commitments for the atmospherics of a deal. Yannis noted the whiplash for Republican China hawks who had followed Trump’s hard line on Beijing only to watch him pivot to what he called “solicitous to the point of obsequiousness” — and wondered whether, as the midterms approach, some of them might finally find the courage to say so.

Russia: Bleeding but Not Breaking

Russia is visibly under strain — economically, militarily, and in its domestic mood — yet none of that appears sufficient to bring the war in Ukraine to an end anytime soon. Carla laid out the numbers in stark detail: roughly 352,000 Russian soldiers dead by the end of 2025; official economic growth forecasts slashed from 1.3 to 0.4 percent despite soaring energy prices; forty percent of national income going to the military; a key interest rate of 14.5 percent; and a state happiness index at a fifteen-year low — all while Russia still falls short of its goal of controlling the full Donbas, which, at the current pace of advancement would take thirty-plus years to achieve. The Victory Day parade on Red Square, stripped of the armor and pageantry Putin has long relied on, was itself a statement, as was the three-day internet shutdown in Moscow — ostensibly to block Ukrainian drones from using mobile signals, but widely read as evidence of a regime unsure of its own population. Yannis added a crucial dimension from the Ukrainian side: the rate of Russian casualties has been extraordinary, running at 30,000 to 35,000 killed or wounded per month in 2026. And yet, as the president of Finland told him in February, Putin is “terrified of what might happen once the war ends,” and will likely keep fighting regardless. Jamil and Yannis both cautioned against premature optimism: Ukraine has gained some territory, Europe is rearming at a remarkable pace , and momentum has shifted — but this is a conflict that all three panelists expected to still be grinding on six months from now, without a decisive turn on the battlefield.

The Gulf Stalemate: A Ceasefire That Isn’t

The ceasefire in the Gulf has now lasted nearly as long as the war that preceded it, but the situation it has frozen is deeply unstable — for global trade, for US credibility, and ultimately for the nuclear question that lurks behind everything else. Yannis described the current arrangement as a double blockade: Iranian de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz on one side, the US Navy on the other, with vessels caught in the middle. A Greek ship owner he spoke with described a tanker carrying Iraqi oil to Vietnam that navigated the Iranian toll system only to be stopped by the Americans — stranded for days while the US military deliberated, with oil-short Southeast Asian countries watching. “The Iranians believe this is developing into a major strategic victory,” Yannis said, “and are very keen not to give up things they’ve won.” Trump, meanwhile, is caught in his own contradiction: desperate to declare victory, unable to accept a deal that structurally resembles the 2015 nuclear deal he spent years denouncing as the worst deal ever, and watching inflation data — driven in no small part by energy prices now roughly 60 percent above pre-war levels — threaten Republican prospects in the midterms. Carla, speaking as a self-described nuclear nerd, offered the most sobering observation of the discussion: even a deal that shipped every gram of enriched uranium out of Iran cannot remove the knowledge from Iranian scientists’ heads, and the core lesson any government in Tehran will draw from this war is that “you are more secure with a nuclear weapon than without one.” Jamil suggested the likely endgame is periodic Israeli and American strikes — “mowing the grass,” as the Israelis call it — which has never actually worked, in Lebanon or in Gaza. As I noted in closing, sometimes diplomacy backed by force is better than no diplomacy and force alone.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed how justice is returning to Syria, the Gulf is divided over Iran, Israel seeks security through destruction, and transatlantic tensions are boiling over. Joining me this week were Deborah Amos of Princeton, Felicia Schwartz of Politico, and Steven Erlanger of the New York Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion.

Syria: Justice Starts Here

Syria is an unlikely source of hope in a deeply troubled region, and nowhere is that more visible than in the courtroom. Reporting from Damascus, Deb described the opening of Syria’s first domestic war crimes trials — a striking development in a country that just over a year ago was still under the grip of the Assad dynasty. The defendant in the inaugural proceeding is the official widely regarded as the man who set off the Syrian revolution, the provincial governor who ordered or allowed the torture of teenagers who had scrawled anti-Assad graffiti, and then failed to act when the subsequent public outrage exploded into a national uprising. Families of victims were permitted into the courtroom to confront him directly. The proceedings are imperfect — Syria has only one judge untainted by the old regime, no law yet for crimes against humanity, no parliament to change the legal framework — and critics question whether former jihadists now in power will ultimately face the same scrutiny. But as Deb noted, the pressure for accountability had been building as Syrians watched European courts deliver more than fifty trials of Assad-era perpetrators and asked why their own country had not begun to do the same. Steve raised the broader challenge of transitional justice — whether societies choose truth and reconciliation, criminal prosecution, or something in between — observing that even Germany, decades on, still grapples with its past. The answer Syria is reaching for is clearly its own: no hybrid court, no international jurors, no template borrowed from Iraq. The trials have begun, and for most Syrians, Deb concluded, that alone is something.

Lebanon and the Gulf: A Ceasefire With a Lot of Fire

If Syria offers a fragile story of hope, Lebanon and the broader Gulf offer something considerably darker. Israel continues to strike targets in southern Lebanon despite a nominal ceasefire, and as Felicia pointed out, Netanyahu faces a domestic political imperative that cuts against any real de-escalation: his government is up for election by late October, the ceasefire was deeply unpopular at home, and hundreds of thousands of Israelis still cannot return to their border communities. Deb observed that for the first time in decades there exists a Lebanese government and a broader Lebanese public willing to contemplate disarming Hezbollah — but only if Israel pursues a diplomatic path rather than treating the south as another Gaza. Instead, Israeli forces are mowing through the region with earthmovers, killing civilians alongside any intended targets, and that approach, she warned, is no way to eliminate Hezbollah. Layered on top of this is the unresolved aftermath of the US-Iran war — described pointedly as “a ceasefire with a lot of fire” — and its reverberations across the Gulf. The Saudis, stung again by American inaction after Iranian strikes on a UAE oil facility and haunted by the failure to respond to the 2019 Houthi attacks, are recalibrating toward coexistence with Iran; the UAE, by contrast, is pressing its advantage. As Steve noted, the Iranians now have enough enriched uranium for roughly ten nuclear weapons, and an IRGC-dominated government may be more willing to use that leverage than any of its predecessors. The region, in short, is not trending toward resolution.

US-Europe: The New Normal Is Not Good

The transatlantic relationship is not merely strained — it is, Steve argued, being structurally dismantled in ways that will not simply reverse when this administration ends. Trump’s fury at NATO predates his presidency by decades, but what is different now is the confluence of grievances: his Greenland obsession and the explicit threat to take it from a NATO ally, the unilateral launch of the Iran war without European consultation, the subsequent pressure on NATO to join a Middle East conflict it was never designed to fight, and the punitive troop withdrawal from Germany triggered by Chancellor Merz’s candid but ill-advised observation that the US lacked an exit strategy. Steve noted that a European ambassador captured the mood precisely: Europeans still believe in America but have entirely lost faith in Donald Trump. Felicia added that the absence of meaningful congressional pushback is not accidental — foreign policy is the arena where presidential power is most unchecked, the midterms loom, and many of the figures who genuinely believed in the alliance have retired or are retiring. Deb brought it home from Berlin, where she spent three weeks and found ordinary Germans quietly factoring the possibility of war into personal decisions, already resigned to the fact that US support could no longer be assumed. Europe, Steve concluded, now understands — more widely and more deeply than ever before — that it must build the conventional defense capacity to replace what America may withdraw. That is not a temporary adjustment. It is a new baseline.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the stalemate in the Iran War, King Charles’s visit to the United States, and Germany’s rearmament. Joining me this week were Anna Sauerbrey of Die Zeit, Alex Ward of the Wall Street Journal, and Giles Whittell of The Observer.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• The Iran war has reached a stalemate, with an indefinite ceasefire, a dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and no negotiations in sight. Alex argued that the entire conflict has turned into a strategic paradox of Trump’s own making. The administration’s standard defense against any criticism — “so you want Iran to have a nuclear weapon?” — turns out to be precisely the outcome the war is making more likely, not less. Iran’s regime is now watching North Korea and drawing exactly the wrong lesson: that giving up your nuclear program, as Libya did, leaves you vulnerable, while keeping it, as Pyongyang has, earns a kind of grudging immunity. The war that was sold as the definitive solution to Iranian nuclearization may end up being the most powerful argument for it. And as Giles reminded us, there is a deeper structural reason why this stalemate favors Iran: ninety million people, a vast geography, a brutal regime indifferent to its own population’s suffering, and a powerful ally in Russia. The idea that Iran must eventually cave under pressure, Giles argued, simply isn’t supported by the evidence — Russia has shown us how resilient a large, autocratic country can be in the face of international sanctions.

• Who would have thought that King Charles III’s visit to Washington would be the week’s most uplifting story? The King’s address to a joint session of Congress prompted a genuinely insightful observation by Anna — not about diplomacy or the special relationship, but about political culture. What struck her was that Americans needed their newspapers to explain how to read a subtle speech: what the King’s gestures meant, what his wardrobe signaled, how to parse an implied criticism. That this required instruction at all says something dispiriting about where public discourse has landed. In a moment of wall-to-wall noise, the King demonstrated that restraint and indirection can command more attention than amplification — a lesson that transcends monarchy and speaks to something fundamental about how meaning gets made in politics. Alex added a key corollary: the speech only worked because a king delivered it. Had Starmer or Macron or Merz said the same things, Trump would have been on Truth Social within the hour. Royalty, it turns out, is one of the few currencies that still buys goodwill in this White House.

• Germany is rearming at a pace and scale not seen since World War II, and it is changing the face of Europe. The most unsettling point in our conversation wasn’t about Russia or even about Franco-German rivalry over procurement — it was the structural warning Anna raised, drawing on historian Liana Fix’s recent Foreign Affairs piece, that a vastly more capable German military is only as trustworthy as the government that commands it. The AfD, already polling ahead of the CDU for the first time, represents a non-trivial future scenario, and the concern isn’t a re-run of 1939 but something more contemporary: the same democratic backsliding Europe has been anxiously watching elsewhere could, in Germany of all places, put an emboldened far-right party in command of the continent’s largest defense budget. Giles cut through the procurement rivalries and historical anxieties to identify what he sees as the core problem: Europe has broad agreement on what needs to be done, but no functioning decision-making architecture to do it — not within the EU, not within NATO absent American leadership. Rearmament, it turns out, is only reassuring if you trust both the hands it ends up in and the institutions that are supposed to coordinate it.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the implications of an indefinite ceasefire in the Iran War, prospects for resolving the conflict in Lebanon, and the new vibe in Ukraine. Joining me this week were of the Substack “Cosmopolitics,” Prashant Rao of Semafor, and Matt Kaminski of the Middle East Broadcasting Network

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• The ceasefire between the United States and Iran may be holding, but the deeper damage to the global economy is only beginning to reveal itself. With no ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, liquefied natural gas supplies are unlikely to return to normal until 2028, aluminum and helium are in short supply, and JP Morgan is warning of rising gas prices in the United States — just ahead of the midSegment 1: Iran / Strait of Hormuz The ceasefire between the United States and Iran may be holding, but the deeper damage to the global economy is only beginning to reveal itself. With no ships traversing the Strait of Hormuz, liquefied natural gas supplies are unlikely to return to normal until 2028, aluminum and helium are in short supply, and JP Morgan is warning of rising gas prices in the United States — just ahead of the midterms. But the most consequential shift may be structural and permanent. As Prashant Rao reported from the Semaphore World Economy Summit, the consensus among global CEOs, finance ministers, and central bank governors was unambiguous: every major power is now working to render its vulnerability to Hormuz irrelevant. The IEA’s Fatih Birol told him that every new gas supply agreement now comes with a new question attached: does this give you leverage over me? The Iranians, Rao observed, have taught the same lesson the Chinese taught during the trade war: “showing your hand when you have an asymmetrical advantage” has consequences that outlast any ceasefire.

• A fragile ceasefire in Lebanon has been extended for three more weeks, and for the first time in decades, Israeli and Lebanese representatives are holding direct talks in Washington. But the underlying conditions remain unchanged, and Lebanon itself has had little say in shaping the process, which is being driven more by Washington than any regional power. The more important question is whether this moment — unprecedented in its strategic opportunity — will be seized or squandered. With Assad gone, Iran weakened, and Hezbollah’s leadership decapitated, Lebanon has capable new leaders in President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam who are, for the first time, speaking openly about consolidating military authority under the state. Matt argued that Lebanon has “never had a better opportunity to really create a proper sovereign state” — but cautioned that the region has a long habit of missing exactly these kinds of openings. The diplomatic bandwidth to exploit the moment, Elise warned, matters even more right now than the military dimension: the work requires patience, precision, and an understanding of the region’s equities that the Trump administration has yet to demonstrate.

• Four years into the war, the assumptions underpinning the Ukraine conflict have quietly but fundamentally shifted. Russia is losing an estimated 30,000 soldiers a month, its economy is showing deep signs of strain, and its spring offensive has yielded virtually no territorial gains. Meanwhile, Ukraine has transformed itself into what Matt called the Silicon Valley of Europe in defense innovation, pioneering drone warfare and cultivating technology partnerships that major European powers now see as essential to their own rearmament. Zelensky’s outreach to the Gulf — offering Ukraine’s four years of experience fighting Iranian drones as a calling card — is emblematic of a broader strategic pivot: Kyiv is diversifying its alliances and no longer assuming American support will anchor its war effort. And as Prashant observed, the United States remains necessary for any diplomatic resolution — but it is far from clear where the bandwidth for that comes from, “given that at the moment all eyes in Washington are on the Middle East.”

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed Trump’s televised speech on Wednesday night, the global ripples of the closed Strait of Hormuz, and Israel’s 30-month war. Joining me this week were Christina Ruffini, cohost of Bloomberg This Weekend, Karin Axelsson, EU correspondent for the Danish newspaper Politiken, and Jamie Dettmer, Associate Editor and Foreign Affairs Columnist for Politico Europe.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• The week ended with some good news: a ceasefire in Lebanon, a reopening of the Strait, and negotiations possibly resuming in Pakistan this weekend. But none of these encouraging steps are certain. Israel has continued to strike some targets in Lebanon, and Prime Minister Netanyahu is under pressure to resume the fighting. Iran says the Strait is open to all commercial traffic, but the US is continuing to block ships from or to Iranian ports. And while mediators have been busy this past week, bridging the gaps between the US and Iran will not be easy. Certainly not in a day or two of talks. Is there a way to move things forward? The answer, surprisingly, may come from Europe. While European leaders have been stuck between the effects of the war and not wanting to get involved, Karin argued they are far more aligned than observers may think. European governments were critical in past negotiations with Iran, and still have diplomatic presence in Tehran. If Washington were willing—a big if, admittedly—European involvement in negotiations might be able to move the talks forward in ways other countries may not be able to do. That’s particularly true when negotiations move from broad statements to details.

• “It’s the economy, stupid.” That was the lesson following Victor Orbán’s defeat in the Hungarian Presidential elections this week. His opponent, Péter Magyar, campaigned on economic issues, including Hungary’s rural hospital network and failing transit infrastructure. The cronyism that once entrenched Orbán became a liability, as average Hungarians saw rampant corruption favoring Orbán’s family and friends while they increasingly struggled. The defeat shows that it’s pretty hard to be a populist that isn’t popular. Even illiberal regimes are vulnerable if they fail to deliver for their constituents. Jamie argues that EU leaders must be sure to learn the right lessons. Yes, this was a defeat for the European far-right, but economic and social issues motivated this defeat. Unless political leaders in Brussels address those issues, populist movements will continue to find traction.

• We are likely past the high watermark of Trump’s influence among conservatives globally. Trump is seen more and more as a political liability in Europe, rather than as an important ally. Trump and JD Vance openly supported Orbán, but it had no impact at all. Other right-wing leaders are taking notice. Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, faced with a public opinion that is increasingly anti-Trump, has been looking for ways to distance herself from the American President. Trump’s denigration of the Pope last week, provided an opening for her, saying the president comments were “unacceptable.” The bigger question is why Trump decided to take on the Pope. For many it is a sign of increasing political desperation. But he is paying a price, even among his strongest supporters, Christina argued. Evangelical Christians and Catholics are part of Trump’s base. And now he’s losing support among part of that base, notably Latino voters, almost all Catholic, who already turned away from the president over immigration and now see his attacks on the Pope as unbecoming.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed Trump’s televised speech on Wednesday night, the global ripples of the closed Strait of Hormuz, and Israel’s 30-month war. Joining me this week were Catherine Philp, the World Affairs Editor at The Times, David Luhnow, the UK Bureau Chief at The Wall Street Journal, and Michael Birnbaum, the White House correspondent covering the Trump presidency for The Washington Post.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• With a fragile ceasefire taking hold between the United States and Iran, it appears that no one, except perhaps Iran, has been left better off by the conflict. The U.S. has shown that it was unable or unwilling to achieve regime change or extract political concessions from the Iranian government. Instead, the world is left with a retrenched Iran, with a damaged military, but one that still has a tight grip on the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf States’ model as islands of stability within the Middle East has been challenged and economies globally are beginning to feel the effects of higher energy prices. Catherine explores the “diplomatic theater” that we saw from the Trump Administration, suggesting that it pursued Tuesday’s ultimatum while also looking for diplomatic off-ramps and that’s part of how we’ve gotten to such an unclear resolution.

• Could the Iran War be the America’s “Suez moment?” The 1956 Suez Crisis marked the end of the British Empire. Could the Iran War be the beginning of the end of the United States’ time as the leader of the international order? The United States has alienated many of its allies and didn’t even consult its closest, European partners before launching this war. America’s friends are left wondering if they should continue relying on U.S. leadership, particularly states in the Middle East who have had their security situations upended. Michael argues that there will still be demand in some places for U.S. leadership, such as in NATO. Small countries bordering Russia will still seek U.S. defense assurances, but in other parts of the world that demand for stability may look very different.

• The NATO alliance may be in mortal danger. As I wrote this week, Trump has long been skeptical of the U.S. alliance on which the post-War international order has been built. Trump sees diplomacy as inherently transactional and does not understand how the mutual defense alliance benefits the United States, failing to recognize the difference when its starts an offensive war of choice in the Middle East. But Trump’s statements this week and the visit by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte show we may have come very close to the brink. David calls the current situation “like a divorce” and that “things are being said that can’t be unsaid.” The Europeans’ confidence in American leadership is being permanently undermined and the alliance that underpinned so much peace and prosperity seems to be coming apart at the seems.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed Trump’s televised speech on Wednesday night, the global ripples of the closed Strait of Hormuz, and Israel’s 30-month war. Joining me this week were Isabel Coles, Chief International Correspondent at The Observer, Gideon Rachman, the Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator at The Financial Times, and Bobby Ghosh, veteran journalist and host of the Ghoshworld Substack.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• There is a continued lack of clarity on the aims of the ongoing war in Iran and President Trump didn’t do himself any favors during his televised address on Wednesday night. His speech left many questions unanswered, and was mostly a reiteration of the same muddled reasoning that we’ve heard in the previous 31 days. While Trump certainly sought to reassure Americans, there was very little reassurance for the rest of the world, many of whom still fear that the United States will leave the Middle East in chaos. Gideon points out that it’s clear that Trump wanted “another Venezuela” and that he believes the U.S. went to war “out of habit.” But now that he’s stuck, unable to walk away, there is a real risk that Trump falls prey to the attractiveness of high-risk, escalatory military options.

• Global repercussions of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz show that this war isn’t just about Iran. This is already the largest oil disruption in history. Southeast Asian economies that rely on Middle East exports are feeling the impact, with Thais urged to take elevators and other countries shifting to a four-day work week, all in an effort to conserve energy. Europe, which relies less on oil and natural gas but heavily on refined products from the Middle East like diesel and aviation fuel, is already witnessing large price rises. Airlines are reducing service and shipping rates are rising, crushing businesses. One third of all fertilizer ingredients flows through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning the war is also having a seismic effect on world food production and prices. David Miliband, head of the International Rescue Committee, warned of a “slow-motion famine” as fertilizer disruptions come right at the beginning of the spring planting season. Isabel sheds light on the situation in Iraq, where the tenuous coexistence between U.S. and Iranian influence has been shattered as the country comes under attack from both sides. Revenue from oil exports there propped up a teetering economy and created political stability. Now that those are halted, Iraq stands on a political precipice.

• Israel, since the October 7th attacks, has made war on Iranian proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. And now it’s involved in a big war with Iran itself. This week, Israel started a new offensive to expand a “security buffer zone” in southern Lebanon. But it’s unclear that an Israel that continues to expand militarily and territorially means one that is safer. There are limits to what military force can achieve and Israel appears stuck in a strategic dilemma where it continues to achieve tactical military successes, while failing to having strategic impact. Bobby argues that Israeli domestic support for the war has begun to slip and, while many still support military operations, fewer than half now want Israel to fight until the regime collapses. After the war, Israelis are likely to face an Iran that is both wounded and emboldened, much as is the case for Iran’s proxies.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed whether the US is stuck between escalating in Iran or accepting a lesser deal, how Trump’s criticism of NATO is going over in Europe, and what European elections show about the nature of politics in Europe. Joining me this week were Peter Spiegel, Managing Editor at The Washington Post, Stefanie Bolzen, the Washington Correspondent and North America Editor at Die Welt, and Edward Luce, the U.S. National Editor and Columnist for The Financial Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• The way President Trump conducts policy is uniquely vulnerable to the current direction of the war with Iran. Iran now controls who can transit the Strait of Hormuz, extracting payments and holding out for political concessions. Ed argues that the markets are the primary thing that Trump cares about and this gives Iran a “stranglehold on TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out)” as they can force wild swings in oil and stock markets by controlling who can cross the Strait. With disregard for U.S. Allies and for any deliberate policymaking process, Trump has led the United States into this war alone and without a plan. As I’ve pointed out in the past, Trump looks at every negotiation like its a real-estate deal, but the strategic implications of war are very different, and in this negotiation, Iran holds the cards.

• The Iran War may be causing a seismic shift in America’s diplomatic standing in the world. The war has solidified much of what European leaders already thought about the second Trump Administration—that they can no longer count on the U.S. for their security. Allies and partners in East and South Asia are facing an economic and energy crisis, caused by the actions of their friend, the United States. India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who coordinated well with Trump during the first administration, saw the United States as a natural ally. But the Iran War has thrown a wrench into the Indian economy and deepened a split that had already been growing over Trump’s embrace of Pakistan and his criticism of Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. Stefanie points out that while it’s unclear if Europe has taken the actions needed to stand alone, there is now a “common understanding” that they must. While Europeans have disagreed with the U.S. in the past, perhaps the global repercussions of this war signal a truly permanent rupture.

• Recent European elections reflect the increasingly fractured nature of political life in liberal democracies. In Denmark and Germany, the traditional democratic socialist parties lost ground, as they’ve failed to deliver prosperity for younger people. While far-right parties generally failed to pick up support, with a notable exception in Slovenia, the traditional centrist parties aren’t picking it up either. In a recent by-election in the UK, Reform lost, but the Greens, not Labour, picked up the seat. When people feel alienated from the political process, they tend towards revolutionary options. As centrist parties have failed to deliver for European voters, they’ve grown more attracted to the far left and far right. And in the U.S., Peter points out that while discussions within the Trump Administration on the Iran War revolved around building Trump’s “legacy,” many voters are feeling alienated as its only led to higher costs. As our lives become more isolated and in-person politics is replaced by an online version, alienation and the fragmentation it brings will continue to influence liberal democracies.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the war in Iran, its effects on the U.S.-China relationship, and Trump’s statements on wanting to “take” Cuba. Joining me this week were Karen DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior National Security Correspondent at The Washington Post, Robbie Gramer, National Security Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal, and Yaroslav Trofimov, the Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• For the first time in a long time, the United States is looking at a war that’s going to be going on for a good while. Perhaps the best analogy for the war in Iran is not the 2003 Iraq War, but the First Gulf War. There, the United States achieved its objectives, but saw itself drawn deeply into the Middle East for decades. The only way to open the Strait of Hormuz is with either a major ground invasion or a deal. Robbie argued that Iran could keep this war going for a very long time at a “low simmer.” In a deal scenario, Iran would likely seek to require payment from anyone that transits the strait, using extortion to project power. Like it or not, the United States will have to deal with this new state of affairs in the Middle East for years to come—hardly consistent with the pivot to Asia that successive administrations have sought to accomplish.

• A major winner of the conflict in the Middle East may be China. While the Strait of Hormuz is closed to oil shipments to many countries, China is still getting oil, as Iran has allowed some China-bound tankers to transit. The U.S. military is also, once again, bogged down in the Middle East, expending time and precious munitions in this conflict. While China is certainly affected by the global economic shocks, it may not be as bad off as one might think. Yaroslav points out that the more munitions that the U.S. uses in the Middle East, the less there is available for a future contingency in the Indo-Pacific. He also argues that China is learning lessons from Iran. The closer China pulls Iran, the more it can learn about how to counter U.S. technology and munitions.

• While we already knew that this is not a normal presidential administration, the focus on Cuba lays bare how much of Trump’s foreign policy is driven by personality, not process. Cuba is personally important to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and is thus a priority, even amidst the war in Iran. Karen points out that regime change in Cuba is the logical next step for the “Donroe Doctrine,” the idea guiding Trump’s quest for supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela was a precursor to Cuba, now, the Trump Administration can either wait and squeeze Cuba economically or try a Venezuela-style regime decapitation. Economic strangulation is the most likely path. Robbie also points out how a normal administration, relying on an inter-agency process might be able to handle a U.S.-China summit at the same time as operations in Iran, but Trump relies only on a set of close, personal advisors. This makes his administration very decisive, but makes it hard to “walk and chew gum” at the same time.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the war in Iran, how it ends, its global impacts, and Israel’s many wars. Joining me this week were Carla Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Susan Glasser, Staff Writer at the New Yorker, and Steven Erlanger, the Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for Europe for the New York Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• “Tell me how this ends.” That was the question then Brigadier-General David Petraeus asked of a journalists shortly after the start of the Iraq War in 2003. As the War in Iran continues to rage, the question is even more apt. Susan argued that the difference this time is a President who feels unencumbered by the need to let the American people know what’s happening. President Trump is going to claim success no matter what happens. As he recently said, “we’ve won but we’re not done yet.” Carla pointed out that the war is costing an extraordinary amount of money. The Department of Defense has clear “red lines” of how low their stockpiles of critical munitions can go, but it’s not revealing where the red lines are. Even more worrisome is the likelihood that the war may leave U.S. unable to deal with new threats in other, potentially more vital regions. “What if Putin decided to invade a Baltic country right now?” Steve pointed out that the U.S. approach to allies and the international community is also entirely different from 2003. In 2003, the Bush Administration made the case to allies and the United Nations. Trump doesn’t care about what allies think. He didn’t consult them and it’s not even clear he told them before the war started.

• As the war drags on, the global impact of the war continue to reverberate. Carla pointed out that allies are feeling the impact of the war. European energy prices are skyrocketing, and the Gulf States may not like the chaos that Trump leaves behind. Susan argued that the U.S. war in Iran is costing billions while putting billions more in Russia’s pocket to fight in Ukraine. Did the U.S. have a plan for dealing with the closure of the Straight of Hormuz? Is the American military actually ready for this new age of drone warfare? Trump rejected Zelensky’s offer for help, but now the U.S. military is rapidly trying to integrate Ukrainian technology and expertise. Steven maintained that the European reaction is less divided as is often portrayed. Their overriding aim is not to participate in this war, because they’ believe it is illegal and a big strategic mistake. Ukraine is the priority for Europe. This is not the “supine Europe” that we’re led to believe exists; they realize that they will bear more of the consequences than Americans will.

• The continuation of the war by Israel is happening within a context of many ongoing wars. Israel is conducting airstrikes in Iran while also engaging in an escalating campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel also has an unfinished conflict in Gaza and continues to supported expanded settlements in the West Bank. Steven argued that Bibi Netanyahu brought the United States into this war. Netanyahu has talked a lot about the Iranian nuclear program and more recently the ballistic missile program, which is a threat to Israel but not the United States. Since October 7, 2003, Netanyahu has also been very effective as Prime Minister, reestablishing deterrence, destroying Hezbollah and Hamas, and putting the Iranians on the back foot. Israel is ascendent throughout the Middle East and the Iranian security apparatus is in shambles. This war will create effects across the Middle East similar to how the collapse of the Soviet Union changed Europe. Carla argued that even a shattered Iran could be extremely dangerous, particularly one sitting on a pile of nuclear material. Will Israel be comfortable with a totally unstable Iran? Susan pointed out that the political calendar for Israel matters. Netanyahu is the longest serving PM in Israeli history, this strengthens his hand in elections and distracts from the unfinished war in Gaza. Israel has been able to really penetrate Iranian society, but can it turn that tactical brilliance into strategic success? Israeli and US leadership are telling their public the war is about Iranian strength, but they’re telling themselves it’s about Iranian weakness. There is hubris in thinking tactical and technological prowess can create political change.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

BIG NEWS: World Review is going radio!

Starting this Sunday, at 7:00 a.m. central time, World Review can be heard on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to the show. Today, March 6th, we discussed the ongoing War in Iran, the economic and political shockwave it has caused around the world, and the Pentagon’s ongoing war with. Joining me this week were Nahal Toosi, the Senior Foreign Correspondent at Politico, Anton La Guardia, the Diplomatic Editor at The Economist, and Prashant Rao, the Senior Editor at Semafor.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• As the Iran War enters it second week, the political ends of the conflict remain confused. President Trump has been unclear on what his aims are, while Republicans in Congress seem focused on not calling this a war to avoid having to take a vote. Nahal points out that as the conflict continues, Democrats in Congress will have to coordinate on a response as decisions on funding arise. Prashant points out that the operation itself makes the 2003 Iraq War look well-planned, with a complete lack of aligning current ends with the means to accomplish them. Anton frames the mixed aims of the operation as different people within the administration fighting different wars. Secretary of Defense Hegseth are focused on highlighting lethality, while others arms of governments respond within their own narrow purviews. He also sees some of the unclear aims as deliberate, as Trump likes the flexibility to claim victory and avoid responsibility no matter the outcome. Prashant warns that “federalizing power” in another state, creating a weak center and strengthening other actors, can be dangerous and unpredictable.

• While the Iran War continues, economic and political shockwaves reverberate across the region and the world. Prashant points out that despite the remarkably high interception rate of incoming Iranian attacks, there has been a high cost across the Gulf States. The ways in which cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi have fashioned themselves as global cities has been derailed. Globally, the Straight of Hormuz through which 20% of the world’s oil travels, is closed. Fiscal impacts are already being felt in South Korea and other Asian economies. States that rely on importing finished petroleum products, such as Nigeria, face a looming economic catastrophe. Russian efforts in the Ukraine War are already being buoyed by increased energy sales. War is happening in a concentrated space but reverberating economically, politically, and psychologically across the world.

• Anton argues that one way to see this conflict is as the “Third Gulf War.” Past Gulf Wars ended up as defining moments in American world leadership; The First Gulf War in 1991 defined the U.S. as a hegemon. The Second, in 2003, was the beginning of American decline and involvement in the “forever wars.” This war will likely be epoch defining as well. It may be the beginning of driving a wedge into the “axis of autocracy” or of America getting so bogged down that China and others can rise. For now it, is too soon to tell.

• The Pentagon took aim at Anthropic this week, the only AI firm that had a contract with the Pentagon to work with classified systems. The firm raised issues with some of the ways its tools could be used by the government. Secretary Hegseth and President Trump hit back at the firm, declaring it a supply chain risk. Anton reports that as AI is seeping into all forms of life, it is also seeping into war. U.S. military personnel have indicated that AI has been key to strike planning in the war. He asked whether it may have been used in the strike on a girls school in Iran that killed a reported 175 people. Prashant asserts that standing up to the DoD was a wise move by Anthropic, that they recognize that although the Pentagon budget is large, it is not the whole universe for these companies and mass consumption is much bigger. Nahal argues that we have to ask both “is it ok for the government to be telling a company what to do?” but also, “is it ok for a company to dictate what the government can do?” Already, we’ve seen Elon Musk’s decision to cut off Starlink access to Russian troops impact how wars are being fought. Anton agrees that in an ideal world, Congress would be regulating AI and resolving these disputes. However, the technology may be advancing faster than our dysfunctional political moment can regulate.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Each Friday morning, I host a video podcast called “World Review with Ivo Daalder” where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 27, ahead of the strikes on Iran, we discussed the anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision on Trump’s tariffs, and recent developments in Cuba. Joining me this week were Felicia Schwartz, Diplomatic Correspondent of Politico, Giles Whittell, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of The Observer, and Michael D. Shear, Chief U.K. Correspondent of The New York Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Tuesday marked four years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The stalemate is leaving its mark on the country and its people. Giles described a story from Kherson, where a three-year-old went outside for the first time in his life last December. The front line is a drone-patrolled kill zone stretching some 30 kilometers, where movement in daylight can be a death sentence. The numbers are staggering on both sides, with Russia losing roughly 30,000 soldiers a month and Ukraine paying an even higher price relative to its population. The debate in Washington appears far removed from this reality. Felicia notes that the focus is mostly on the negotiations, while the public’s and the President’s attention wanes. Michael notes Europe has the will but not the means to meaningfully support Ukraine, and continues to defer to and rely on Washington in the negotiations. Giles warned that Russia is the closest to having a plan, to keep grinding forward, and to try to weaken NATO, while Europe struggles with its own internal vetoes and unfinished debates over frozen assets. 2026 will be a test for whether Europe can get organized fast enough, otherwise the talk of standing up for Ukraine risks staying just that, talk.

• The Supreme Court decision that Trump cannot use emergency powers to impose tariffs is a direct hit on his favorite instrument of leverage. Michael framed Trump’s worldview as the fusion of money and power, with tariffs functioning less as trade policy than as a club he can swing at allies and adversaries alike. The ruling produced a global exhale, weakening the threat that every disagreement can be met with economic punishment. But the relief is tempered by the obvious reality that Trump is already looking for workarounds, including temporary across-the-board tariffs under other authorities. Giles argued that the judgment creates a moment of choice for everyone else, whether to keep courting Washington or to start pushing back. The UK has so far chosen deference. The bigger question is whether the European Union, with more economic weight, decides this is the opening to get tougher, even as Michael noted that interconnected dependencies, especially on security, make it hard for capitals to tell Trump no in one arena without worrying about retaliation in another. As Felicia noted, while the Supreme Court may have constrained the President’s power, the underlying dynamic remains: the world is still trying to work out how to deal with an American president who treats tariffs as a form of personal power.

• Cuba returned to the conversation through a bizarre incident that felt like it was from another era: a stolen speedboat run from the Florida Keys and ten would-be infiltrators. But the larger story is that the US has long held the conviction that the project in Cuba is ending. The Trump administration continues the pressure campaign with an oil embargo. Felicia argued that Marco Rubio is the key here, given his long-held fixation on transforming Cuba. He now has real authority to try. The administration appears to have departed from the old dream of toppling the system overnight and is instead pursuing regime change light: exerting economic pressure and trying to find a next-generation insider to open the island up for business. The Obama administration tried to change Cuba with carrots and optimism about markets. Trump’s approach is to use sticks to elicit concessions. Whether that strategy will be more effective remains an open question.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 20, we discussed the looming risk of war with Iran, the rapid consolidation of power in Syria as the United States pulls out its troops, and the Trump administration’s increasingly explicit effort to champion far-right politics in Europe. Joining me this week were Liz Sly, Correspondent-at-large of The Washington Post, Bobby Ghosh, journalist and editor for Time, Bloomberg, and CNN, and Matt Kaminski, Editorial Chair of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks and Co-founder of Politico Europe.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Iran feels like a classic game of chicken, except neither side has spelled out what the off-ramp looks like. The administration has assembled the largest naval and air posture in the region since the invasion of Iraq, and as Bobby put it, a gun placed on the mantle in the first act tends to get fired by the third. The temptation for Trump is obvious: he prefers coercion without American boots on the ground, he believes he has already gotten away with limited strikes before, and after a rough political week at home, he has reason to want a distraction or a win. But support for his plans in the region is slim. Liz explained that Gulf states have been quietly drawing red lines, refusing to be used as launch pads and trying to keep themselves out of the blast radius of possible Iranian retaliation. Matt argued that there is more than improvisation here, that parts of the administration see this as one piece of a larger project to remake the Middle East and isolate Tehran, potentially through a strike followed by tighter economic pressure. The problem is that the desired end state is still unclear. Even if the supreme leader were removed, the Revolutionary Guard holds the power, and Liz described the idea that they would calmly bargain their way into a profitable post-revolutionary future as a fantasy. In other words, the United States may be betting that pressure produces pragmatists, while Iran is betting it can wait out until the President’s attention shifts elsewhere.

• In Syria, the new government has managed to consolidate its power significantly. Liz described how Damascus has, for the first time in more than a decade, reasserted control over nearly all Syrian territory, helped by an agreement that integrates the Kurdish-led forces into the Syrian army while allowing local security in a small number of Kurdish majority towns. As US troops withdraw, the biggest near-term risks are familiar: what happens with the detention camps, what happens to escaped militants, and whether ISIS finds the opening it has long been waiting for. While ISIS has failed to consolidate power so far, Matt cautioned that Syria still faces scepticism from neighbouring states in the region, a rising Turkey eager to expand its influence, and an Israel deeply skeptical of the new order. Bobby argued there is more hope now than at any time in years, even if the Kurdish question will not disappear simply because a deal has been signed. If there is a lesson here, it is that the best case is no longer unimaginable, but it is fragile, and the next two months of implementation will tell us whether Syria is becoming a state again or merely entering a new phase of managed instability.

• The Trump administration appears to be increasingly bolstering its support for far-right movements in Europe. Matt captured the mood in Munich, where Marco Rubio received a standing ovation largely because he did not punch Europe in the nose, and because he articulated, in more civilized language, the argument that the Transatlantic alliance still matters for economics, security, and competition with China. But the performance continued after Munich, with Rubio traveling to Slovakia and Hungary and calling Viktor Orbán’s staying in power a vital American interest. Matt called it cognitive dissonance: you cannot claim Europe is essential and then openly meddle in its domestic politics. What the administration may be underestimating is that US support may not actually work in favour of the European far-right. In the UK context, as Liz pointed out, Nigel Farage may be personally close to Trump, but in Europe, association with Trump is often a liability. But Bobby warned that, even though the far-right movement is more aligned with Moscow than Washington, the administration’s actions may still affect tight elections.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 14, coming to you from the Munich Security Conference, we discussed the widening transatlantic divide, the fight over what comes after the American-led global order, and how Ukraine is slipping from the center of the conversation even as the war grinds on. Joining me this week were Karin Axelsson, EU Correspondent of Politiken, Steve Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent of The New York Times, and Alexander Ward, National Security Reporter of The Wall Street Journal.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• It has been an eventful weekend in Munich, but despite spending Valentine’s Day together, the relationship between Europe and the US remains fragile. Europeans wanted to hear that Washington still sees the continent as a partner, and Marco Rubio delivered that reassurance in softer language than last year’s speech by JD Vance. But as Karin noted, the underlying ultimatum still came through: do it our way, share our values, or be prepared to stand alone. What made this conference feel more on edge was not just the lingering anger over Greenland, but the way the Trump administration continues to frame the core threat as something inside the relationship rather than outside it, as Alex pointed out. If last year, the conference was about America; this year, it is about Europe and how Europeans will respond to this new reality.

• The bigger debate hovering above everything was whether the rules-based order is gone, and if so, what replaces it. Steve drew a useful distinction between Mark Carney’s language of rupture and Friedrich Merz’s language of rift: one implies a clean break, the other an attempt to repair and create a more resilient alliance. As Karin pointed out, Europeans are trying to salvage the rules-based order, but what an alternative world order could look like remains unclear. For years, American leaders have struggled to make the case that the rules-based order of alliances, trade rules, and institutions matters to ordinary voters. Yet declaring the order dead is its own kind of surrender. If the West vacates the institutions it built, Steve warned, others will fill the vacuum, and Europeans, especially smaller states, have no interest in a world where power alone writes the rules.

• Except for the hour Zelenskyy spent on stage, Ukraine was noticeably absent from the conversations in Munich. Alex noted that Ukraine is being sidelined because no one knows what to do. The key question of how to get Putin to end the war remains unanswered. Steve argued it is starting to feel like the United States is losing interest. Karin suggested that in Europe, the debate over Greenland has crowded out attention on Ukraine, which is fighting for Europe’s security and values in real time through another cold winter. As the war drags on, Zelenskyy’s ability to keep pushing for support wears thin, and audiences shrink.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 6, we discussed the talks underway in Oman between the United States and Iran, the latest round of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and Europe’s accelerating push to de-risk from the United States. Joining me this week were Catherine Philp, World Affairs Editor at The Times, Suzanne Lynch, Brussels Bureau Chief of Bloomberg News, and Jamie Dettmer, Opinion Editor and Foreign Affairs Columnist of Politico Europe.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Trump’s armada is steaming toward the Gulf as negotiators meet in Oman, but the basic question remains unsettled: is Washington trying to bargain over the nuclear program, rewrite Iran’s regional posture, or keep the door open to regime change through intimidation? Catherine noted that Tehran’s first small win was procedural, shifting the talks from Istanbul to Oman to keep the agenda tight and centered on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, rather than the laundry list Washington would prefer. Jamie’s point was that the ambiguity is not only between capitals but also within Washington, where parts of the coalition around Trump remain deeply skeptical of another war, even as the President continues his maximal demands. As Suzanne pointed out, without a clear strategy, America’s allies remain concerned about what the President’s plans for a quick win in the region might entail.

• The second round of direct talks between Ukrainians and Russians matters, but it should not be mistaken for a turning point. Jamie reported a notable change in tone: fewer ideological lectures from the Kremlin negotiators, more practical and technical discussions, and different faces at the table. Yet the central question remains: what are Putin’s intentions? Is this a genuine negotiation, or an attempt to buy time while Russia presses its advantage on the battlefield and, above all, in the energy war? The sticking points have not moved. Territory is still the core dispute, and security guarantees remain the political price Kyiv would need to pay to sell any compromise at home, especially amid war weariness increasing and a military that could view concessions as betrayal. Europe is trying to keep Ukraine afloat financially and politically, agreeing on more funding and another sanctions package, but as Suzanne noted, Europeans are still effectively on the outside of the peace talks that would shape their own security. Meanwhile, as temperatures plunge, strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure continue. What I found most notable is the contrast between the three discussions that seem to be taking place simultaneously: The negotiation in Abu Dhabi is about not provoking Trump, the conversation in Brussels is about replacing an American role that has faded, and the conversation in Kyiv is about survival. As Catherine pointed out, as the discussions continue, we are settling into a long war of attrition, accompanied by a diplomatic process that exists mainly to manage one man’s temper.

• Europe is beginning to talk about the United States the way it used to talk about China: as a dependency to be reduced rather than a partner to be trusted. Suzanne argued the mood has changed significantly since the Greenland crisis, especially as President Trump threatened tariffs as punishment for allies who would not line up behind Washington’s position. In response, European leaders have adopted a sharper rhetoric, focused on strategic autonomy, buying European, and digital sovereignty. As Europe seeks to increase its resilience and diversify its markets, a conflict has emerged over tech. European leaders are looking to use their regulatory muscle to limit the power of American tech companies, which the Trump administration is framing as an assault on free speech. As Europe aims to de-risk, Jamie warned that its key challenge is that it is falling behind in the tech and AI race. The old model appears to be failing in three directions at once: cheap Russian energy is gone, open Chinese markets are uncertain, and American security is no longer something Europe can rely on.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Today, January 30, we discussed the growing risk of confrontation with Iran, America's allies turning to China to de-risk from the United States, and how the situation in Venezuela has evolved one month after Maduro was captured. I was traveling this week, and Carla Anne Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the MIA Program at Baruch College’s Marxe School, kindly sat in as host. Joining her this week were Karen DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior National Security Correspondent of The Washington Post, and Philip Stephens, Contributing Editor of The Financial Times.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• While the protests in Iran have calmed down, President Trump’s threats of intervention have not. But as Karen laid out, the administration’s goals remain unclear. Gulf partners are trying to put constraints on Washington, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly refusing access to their airspace for a possible US attack on Iran while urging diplomacy, because they fear they would bear the brunt of retaliation. The split-screen within the administration only deepens the uncertainty. President Trump suggests the armada he has sent to the region is ready to act if Iran does not sign a deal, while Secretary of State Rubio describes it as “preemptively defensive,” a phrase that, as Philip noted, carries echoes of the invasion of Iraq and has raised questions in European capitals. The strategic dilemma is simple and dangerous. If the United States hits first, Iran will almost certainly hit back across the region, and there is no guarantee the exchange ends on Washington’s preferred timetable. If the administration does not act, the question becomes what all this was for, beyond another episode of coercive theater.

• The visits to Beijing by Mark Carney and now Keir Starmer appear to be about more than just trade. Philip argued that Europe has moved, in remarkably little time, from talking about de-risking from China to talking about de-risking from the United States. That shift is beginning to shape decisions that once would have been unthinkable, from trade diversification to a more pragmatic willingness to tolerate some risk in a partnership with China that officials had been trying to reduce. The changed risk calculation in Europe has been accelerated by a puzzle at the heart of Washington’s own posture. The administration’s rhetoric says China is the central challenge, yet its tone and signals often look soft, including the National Defense Strategy released by the Pentagon last week. President Trump appears fixated on his personal relationship with Xi Jinping and unwilling to jeopardize the upcoming summit. European allies hear warnings about getting too close to Beijing, but they also see Washington itself making exceptions and sending mixed messages, which makes hedging feel not only prudent but necessary.

• A month after Maduro was captured, the question of who is running Venezuela remains up for debate. Karen argues there is no evidence the United States has taken control of anything except the oil industry, even as the administration lavishes praise on Delcy Rodríguez and presses for the departure of Iran, Russia, China, and Cuba without a clear enforcement mechanism. The new oil law appears to give American oil companies everything they wanted. Yet, as Philip warned, the investment horizon of major energy firms is measured in decades, and the basic prerequisites of stability and security are still missing. The lack of a clear strategy may risk jeopardizing the President’s declared commercial win for the oil industry. The same pattern shows up in the wider region. The new executive order aimed at choking off oil flows to Cuba is another escalation of pressure without a clear statement of what would satisfy the administration’s interests, beyond vague language about alignment with American priorities.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, January 23, Carla Anne Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the MIA Program at Baruch College’s Marxe School, filled in for me while I was traveling. She discussed a possible agreement on Greenland, President Trump’s new “Board of Peace” meant to rival the UN, and the state of the global economy. Joining her this week were Stefanie Bolzen, Washington Correspondent of Die Welt, Robbie Gramer, National Security Reporter of The Wall Street Journal, and Prashant Rao, Senior Editor of Semafor.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Discussions on Greenland continued in Davos this week, where President Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed on a framework, but the details of the agreement remain unclear. Robbie argued that the US already had access to most of the elements of a possible deal, including unfettered military access, under the previous defense agreement with Denmark. Nevertheless, the President appears to have backed off his tariff threats against European allies, but the damage is lasting. As Stefanie pointed out, a majority of Europeans now call Trump the enemy of Europe. But the underlying issue remains that Europe does not know how to respond to the President’s threats and lacks a clear plan B.

• Next to Greenland, Europe must also find a response to President Trump’s proposal for a Board of Peace. Originally proposed to resolve the conflict in Gaza, the Trump administration has since tried to broaden it to rival the role of the UN. As Robbie argued, the Board of Peace strikes at a central truth that the UN system is dysfunctional and not fit for the modern age. The administration sees value in disrupting this ineffective system. But so far, the success in getting other countries to sign on seems limited. As Stefanie pointed out, the Board of Peace has not received much traction in Europe, with German officials avoiding commenting on the proposal. Most European countries, except Hungary, have declined the invitation to join.

• Canada was disinvited from the Board of Peace following Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech in Davos and his recent trip to China, during which he discussed a new strategic partnership. Prashant argued that Carney has taken a big risk, given his country’s reliance on trade with the US. But as tensions between the US and China rise, more and more countries are facing a similar difficult choice about whom to align with. What does all this mean for the state of the global economy? Growth has remained surprisingly resilient despite tariffs and persistent political uncertainty. Prashant suggested that part of the answer may be that exporters have absorbed most of the costs, while investment in AI continues to drive growth. But this form of jobless growth and protectionism may not be sustainable, especially as other countries seek new trade partnerships outside the United States.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, January 16, we discussed the evolving situation in Iran, the growing transatlantic divide over Greenland and Ukraine, and whether anyone can constrain President Trump on foreign policy. Joining me this week were Yasmeen Abutaleb, Politics Reporter of The Washington Post, Gideon Rachman, Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator of the Financial Times, and Christopher Miller, Chief Ukraine Correspondent of the Financial Times.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• As preparations are underway for President Trump’s meeting with President Zelenskyy in Davos, divisions in the transatlantic relationship are growing over Greenland, raising questions about whether Europe can rely on US security commitments, including in Ukraine. Chris described Kyiv’s strategy as a race to get commitments in writing, hoping in particular for Trump’s commitment to security guarantees. But as Gideon warned, the credibility of such commitments is highly questionable. Without a credible U.S. backstop, the proposed European reassurance force also does not seem to be a viable alternative. What may be motivating the Ukrainians is avoiding further blame for impeding peace, but as Yasmeen pointed out, President Trump continues to reserve the most vicious rhetoric for Zelenskyy. Whether we can actually expect any progress in Davos remains unclear.

• The Iranian crackdown on protests this week was a grim lesson in how quickly a moment of hope can collide with the hard reality of state repression. Gideon argued that the central fact was not the scale of the protests but the regime’s willingness to use massive violence, and that without a split in the security forces, crackdowns can succeed even when the underlying legitimacy crisis deepens. What could have changed the calculus is outside intervention, but President Trump did not deliver on his threats. The external pressure from partners in the region, who were unprepared for retaliation, and the lack of viable military options that could deliver a quick win, likely led the President to walk away. As Yasmeen pointed out, looking at the history of the Arab Spring, even if the President had intervened, regime change cannot guarantee a solution to Iran’s problems. Instead, the government may simply be replaced by a more repressive one. Drawing comparisons to Ukraine, Chris noted that the key to success is organizing and laying the groundwork for a successful transition once the opportunity arises. While the protests may have stopped, the underlying grievances remain and will likely fuel future challenges to the regime.

• All of this leads to the most unsettling question: if Trump can move this fast across so many fronts, who can stop him? Domestically, Yasmeen suggested that Congress has largely surrendered the tools that usually restrain a president, and the courts have not provided a consistent restraint either. Republicans remain unwilling to restrain his authority, which was made clear this week when Senators Hawley and Young flipped and voted against the War Powers Resolution. Until Democrats control one or both chambers of Congress, he remains unbound. Internationally, Gideon noted that Europe’s history of dependence on the US has made European leaders hesitant to push back, only inviting further demands from Trump. As long as Europe is unwilling to entertain the possibility of breaking with America, Trump will continue to do what he wants. Credible pushback appears to be the only language the President respects. Chris noted that Ukraine’s leaders have repeatedly tried to manage Trump through personal persuasion and high-stakes meetings, with mixed results. The real constraint may ultimately come not from appeals to shared values, but from the costs of failure: a collapsed peace process and political consequences at home that reintroduce limits President Trump does not currently feel.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

On Friday, January 9, we discussed the military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, President Trump’s plans for Greenland, and protests erupting in Iran. Joining me this week were Felicia Schwartz, Diplomatic Correspondent of Politico, Bobby Ghosh, journalist and editor who writes for Time, Bloomberg, and CNN, and Yaroslav Trofimov, Chief Foreign-Affairs Correspondent of The Wall Street Journal.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Venezuela may be the most vivid example yet of how this administration pairs shock tactics with a poorly improvised endgame. Felicia called the Maduro operation a “surprising non-surprise,” as the administration had put pressure on the regime for months. Yet the scale of the operation was surprising in its sheer audacity: an overnight raid, an early-morning post from Trump announcing Maduro was en route to New York to face trial, and a press conference declaring the U.S. would now “run” the country. What that looks like remains unclear. Looking at the past, we would expect a call for elections and a plan to handover to the opposition. Instead, as Yaroslav points out, the U.S. appears to want to rule the country by remote control by putting pressure on Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, a strategy reminiscent of the age of empires. This may be particularly challenging given the country’s size, complex geography, and well-armed military and paramilitary groups, as Bobby points out. He expects much greater resistance once Rodríguez has consolidated her power and concluded that the Trump administration is hesitant to put boots on the ground. For now, the White House is trying to turn the raid into a commercial opening for the oil industry. But this may prove more challenging than expected, given oil companies think in decades, not news cycles. As long as the question of what “running” Venezuela actually means remains unanswered, we may not see much progress on the President’s oil agenda either.

• Following his claim of success in Venezuela, the President turned his attention back to Greenland, raising anxiety in European capitals over the future of the NATO alliance. Yaroslav described the threat to Greenland as a form of naked imperialism we haven’t seen in generations, motivated by resources, security, and power projection. But the administration’s motivations do not hold up to reason. Greenland’s resources are largely inaccessible, and as Bobby points out, America has reduced, not expanded, its military presence in Greenland over time because modern defense no longer requires a large number of bases in the Arctic. Despite their questionable arguments, Felicia points out that Washington isn’t treating this as a joke and that European leaders should take these threats seriously. Trump sees this through a real estate lens and has learned he can bully his allies into giving him what he wants. But even in the absence of any actions from the administration, these threats have very real consequences, emboldening Russia and casting doubt on the U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance.

• The President has also threatened to intervene in Iran, where a new wave of protests has sparked a debate over the possibility of regime change. Bobby pointed out that the regime is the weakest it has been in decades, battered strategically after severe blows to its regional proxies, economically strangled by mismanagement and sanctions, and now facing a currency in free fall. But what may make the biggest difference is who is protesting. When bazaaris, the shopkeepers and traders, close their shops and join the protests, it signals a significant change. The last time this constituency moved decisively against the regime, it was the final straw that brought down the Shah. As Yaroslav points out, the regime may be facing a perfect storm, humiliated by previous attacks and under pressure from the Trump administration. Felicia cautioned that U.S. officials inside the administration were unsure what Trump meant by being “locked and loaded.” She suggested the administration may be pulled less by a plan than by pressure from a Republican foreign-policy establishment that remembers the criticism of Obama’s restraint in 2009, and now wants visible support for protesters. But protests only succeed when security forces refuse to shoot, and the Iranian government has spent decades proving it is willing to shoot its own people. This uprising may be different. But even if it is, as Bobby warned, it won’t necessarily end in a neat replay of 1979, with a single figure returning from abroad to “complete” a revolution.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.