Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed Trump’s televised speech on Wednesday night, the global ripples of the closed Strait of Hormuz, and Israel’s 30-month war. Joining me this week were Catherine Philp, the World Affairs Editor at The Times, David Luhnow, the UK Bureau Chief at The Wall Street Journal, and Michael Birnbaum, the White House correspondent covering the Trump presidency for The Washington Post.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• With a fragile ceasefire taking hold between the United States and Iran, it appears that no one, except perhaps Iran, has been left better off by the conflict. The U.S. has shown that it was unable or unwilling to achieve regime change or extract political concessions from the Iranian government. Instead, the world is left with a retrenched Iran, with a damaged military, but one that still has a tight grip on the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf States’ model as islands of stability within the Middle East has been challenged and economies globally are beginning to feel the effects of higher energy prices. Catherine explores the “diplomatic theater” that we saw from the Trump Administration, suggesting that it pursued Tuesday’s ultimatum while also looking for diplomatic off-ramps and that’s part of how we’ve gotten to such an unclear resolution.

• Could the Iran War be the America’s “Suez moment?” The 1956 Suez Crisis marked the end of the British Empire. Could the Iran War be the beginning of the end of the United States’ time as the leader of the international order? The United States has alienated many of its allies and didn’t even consult its closest, European partners before launching this war. America’s friends are left wondering if they should continue relying on U.S. leadership, particularly states in the Middle East who have had their security situations upended. Michael argues that there will still be demand in some places for U.S. leadership, such as in NATO. Small countries bordering Russia will still seek U.S. defense assurances, but in other parts of the world that demand for stability may look very different.

• The NATO alliance may be in mortal danger. As I wrote this week, Trump has long been skeptical of the U.S. alliance on which the post-War international order has been built. Trump sees diplomacy as inherently transactional and does not understand how the mutual defense alliance benefits the United States, failing to recognize the difference when its starts an offensive war of choice in the Middle East. But Trump’s statements this week and the visit by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte show we may have come very close to the brink. David calls the current situation “like a divorce” and that “things are being said that can’t be unsaid.” The Europeans’ confidence in American leadership is being permanently undermined and the alliance that underpinned so much peace and prosperity seems to be coming apart at the seems.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed Trump’s televised speech on Wednesday night, the global ripples of the closed Strait of Hormuz, and Israel’s 30-month war. Joining me this week were Isabel Coles, Chief International Correspondent at The Observer, Gideon Rachman, the Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator at The Financial Times, and Bobby Ghosh, veteran journalist and host of the Ghoshworld Substack.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• There is a continued lack of clarity on the aims of the ongoing war in Iran and President Trump didn’t do himself any favors during his televised address on Wednesday night. His speech left many questions unanswered, and was mostly a reiteration of the same muddled reasoning that we’ve heard in the previous 31 days. While Trump certainly sought to reassure Americans, there was very little reassurance for the rest of the world, many of whom still fear that the United States will leave the Middle East in chaos. Gideon points out that it’s clear that Trump wanted “another Venezuela” and that he believes the U.S. went to war “out of habit.” But now that he’s stuck, unable to walk away, there is a real risk that Trump falls prey to the attractiveness of high-risk, escalatory military options.

• Global repercussions of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz show that this war isn’t just about Iran. This is already the largest oil disruption in history. Southeast Asian economies that rely on Middle East exports are feeling the impact, with Thais urged to take elevators and other countries shifting to a four-day work week, all in an effort to conserve energy. Europe, which relies less on oil and natural gas but heavily on refined products from the Middle East like diesel and aviation fuel, is already witnessing large price rises. Airlines are reducing service and shipping rates are rising, crushing businesses. One third of all fertilizer ingredients flows through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning the war is also having a seismic effect on world food production and prices. David Miliband, head of the International Rescue Committee, warned of a “slow-motion famine” as fertilizer disruptions come right at the beginning of the spring planting season. Isabel sheds light on the situation in Iraq, where the tenuous coexistence between U.S. and Iranian influence has been shattered as the country comes under attack from both sides. Revenue from oil exports there propped up a teetering economy and created political stability. Now that those are halted, Iraq stands on a political precipice.

• Israel, since the October 7th attacks, has made war on Iranian proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. And now it’s involved in a big war with Iran itself. This week, Israel started a new offensive to expand a “security buffer zone” in southern Lebanon. But it’s unclear that an Israel that continues to expand militarily and territorially means one that is safer. There are limits to what military force can achieve and Israel appears stuck in a strategic dilemma where it continues to achieve tactical military successes, while failing to having strategic impact. Bobby argues that Israeli domestic support for the war has begun to slip and, while many still support military operations, fewer than half now want Israel to fight until the regime collapses. After the war, Israelis are likely to face an Iran that is both wounded and emboldened, much as is the case for Iran’s proxies.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed whether the US is stuck between escalating in Iran or accepting a lesser deal, how Trump’s criticism of NATO is going over in Europe, and what European elections show about the nature of politics in Europe. Joining me this week were Peter Spiegel, Managing Editor at The Washington Post, Stefanie Bolzen, the Washington Correspondent and North America Editor at Die Welt, and Edward Luce, the U.S. National Editor and Columnist for The Financial Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• The way President Trump conducts policy is uniquely vulnerable to the current direction of the war with Iran. Iran now controls who can transit the Strait of Hormuz, extracting payments and holding out for political concessions. Ed argues that the markets are the primary thing that Trump cares about and this gives Iran a “stranglehold on TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out)” as they can force wild swings in oil and stock markets by controlling who can cross the Strait. With disregard for U.S. Allies and for any deliberate policymaking process, Trump has led the United States into this war alone and without a plan. As I’ve pointed out in the past, Trump looks at every negotiation like its a real-estate deal, but the strategic implications of war are very different, and in this negotiation, Iran holds the cards.

• The Iran War may be causing a seismic shift in America’s diplomatic standing in the world. The war has solidified much of what European leaders already thought about the second Trump Administration—that they can no longer count on the U.S. for their security. Allies and partners in East and South Asia are facing an economic and energy crisis, caused by the actions of their friend, the United States. India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who coordinated well with Trump during the first administration, saw the United States as a natural ally. But the Iran War has thrown a wrench into the Indian economy and deepened a split that had already been growing over Trump’s embrace of Pakistan and his criticism of Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. Stefanie points out that while it’s unclear if Europe has taken the actions needed to stand alone, there is now a “common understanding” that they must. While Europeans have disagreed with the U.S. in the past, perhaps the global repercussions of this war signal a truly permanent rupture.

• Recent European elections reflect the increasingly fractured nature of political life in liberal democracies. In Denmark and Germany, the traditional democratic socialist parties lost ground, as they’ve failed to deliver prosperity for younger people. While far-right parties generally failed to pick up support, with a notable exception in Slovenia, the traditional centrist parties aren’t picking it up either. In a recent by-election in the UK, Reform lost, but the Greens, not Labour, picked up the seat. When people feel alienated from the political process, they tend towards revolutionary options. As centrist parties have failed to deliver for European voters, they’ve grown more attracted to the far left and far right. And in the U.S., Peter points out that while discussions within the Trump Administration on the Iran War revolved around building Trump’s “legacy,” many voters are feeling alienated as its only led to higher costs. As our lives become more isolated and in-person politics is replaced by an online version, alienation and the fragmentation it brings will continue to influence liberal democracies.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the war in Iran, its effects on the U.S.-China relationship, and Trump’s statements on wanting to “take” Cuba. Joining me this week were Karen DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior National Security Correspondent at The Washington Post, Robbie Gramer, National Security Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal, and Yaroslav Trofimov, the Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• For the first time in a long time, the United States is looking at a war that’s going to be going on for a good while. Perhaps the best analogy for the war in Iran is not the 2003 Iraq War, but the First Gulf War. There, the United States achieved its objectives, but saw itself drawn deeply into the Middle East for decades. The only way to open the Strait of Hormuz is with either a major ground invasion or a deal. Robbie argued that Iran could keep this war going for a very long time at a “low simmer.” In a deal scenario, Iran would likely seek to require payment from anyone that transits the strait, using extortion to project power. Like it or not, the United States will have to deal with this new state of affairs in the Middle East for years to come—hardly consistent with the pivot to Asia that successive administrations have sought to accomplish.

• A major winner of the conflict in the Middle East may be China. While the Strait of Hormuz is closed to oil shipments to many countries, China is still getting oil, as Iran has allowed some China-bound tankers to transit. The U.S. military is also, once again, bogged down in the Middle East, expending time and precious munitions in this conflict. While China is certainly affected by the global economic shocks, it may not be as bad off as one might think. Yaroslav points out that the more munitions that the U.S. uses in the Middle East, the less there is available for a future contingency in the Indo-Pacific. He also argues that China is learning lessons from Iran. The closer China pulls Iran, the more it can learn about how to counter U.S. technology and munitions.

• While we already knew that this is not a normal presidential administration, the focus on Cuba lays bare how much of Trump’s foreign policy is driven by personality, not process. Cuba is personally important to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and is thus a priority, even amidst the war in Iran. Karen points out that regime change in Cuba is the logical next step for the “Donroe Doctrine,” the idea guiding Trump’s quest for supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela was a precursor to Cuba, now, the Trump Administration can either wait and squeeze Cuba economically or try a Venezuela-style regime decapitation. Economic strangulation is the most likely path. Robbie also points out how a normal administration, relying on an inter-agency process might be able to handle a U.S.-China summit at the same time as operations in Iran, but Trump relies only on a set of close, personal advisors. This makes his administration very decisive, but makes it hard to “walk and chew gum” at the same time.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

World Review can now be heard on Sundays, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time, on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to this week’s show. We discussed the war in Iran, how it ends, its global impacts, and Israel’s many wars. Joining me this week were Carla Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Susan Glasser, Staff Writer at the New Yorker, and Steven Erlanger, the Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for Europe for the New York Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• “Tell me how this ends.” That was the question then Brigadier-General David Petraeus asked of a journalists shortly after the start of the Iraq War in 2003. As the War in Iran continues to rage, the question is even more apt. Susan argued that the difference this time is a President who feels unencumbered by the need to let the American people know what’s happening. President Trump is going to claim success no matter what happens. As he recently said, “we’ve won but we’re not done yet.” Carla pointed out that the war is costing an extraordinary amount of money. The Department of Defense has clear “red lines” of how low their stockpiles of critical munitions can go, but it’s not revealing where the red lines are. Even more worrisome is the likelihood that the war may leave U.S. unable to deal with new threats in other, potentially more vital regions. “What if Putin decided to invade a Baltic country right now?” Steve pointed out that the U.S. approach to allies and the international community is also entirely different from 2003. In 2003, the Bush Administration made the case to allies and the United Nations. Trump doesn’t care about what allies think. He didn’t consult them and it’s not even clear he told them before the war started.

• As the war drags on, the global impact of the war continue to reverberate. Carla pointed out that allies are feeling the impact of the war. European energy prices are skyrocketing, and the Gulf States may not like the chaos that Trump leaves behind. Susan argued that the U.S. war in Iran is costing billions while putting billions more in Russia’s pocket to fight in Ukraine. Did the U.S. have a plan for dealing with the closure of the Straight of Hormuz? Is the American military actually ready for this new age of drone warfare? Trump rejected Zelensky’s offer for help, but now the U.S. military is rapidly trying to integrate Ukrainian technology and expertise. Steven maintained that the European reaction is less divided as is often portrayed. Their overriding aim is not to participate in this war, because they’ believe it is illegal and a big strategic mistake. Ukraine is the priority for Europe. This is not the “supine Europe” that we’re led to believe exists; they realize that they will bear more of the consequences than Americans will.

• The continuation of the war by Israel is happening within a context of many ongoing wars. Israel is conducting airstrikes in Iran while also engaging in an escalating campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel also has an unfinished conflict in Gaza and continues to supported expanded settlements in the West Bank. Steven argued that Bibi Netanyahu brought the United States into this war. Netanyahu has talked a lot about the Iranian nuclear program and more recently the ballistic missile program, which is a threat to Israel but not the United States. Since October 7, 2003, Netanyahu has also been very effective as Prime Minister, reestablishing deterrence, destroying Hezbollah and Hamas, and putting the Iranians on the back foot. Israel is ascendent throughout the Middle East and the Iranian security apparatus is in shambles. This war will create effects across the Middle East similar to how the collapse of the Soviet Union changed Europe. Carla argued that even a shattered Iran could be extremely dangerous, particularly one sitting on a pile of nuclear material. Will Israel be comfortable with a totally unstable Iran? Susan pointed out that the political calendar for Israel matters. Netanyahu is the longest serving PM in Israeli history, this strengthens his hand in elections and distracts from the unfinished war in Gaza. Israel has been able to really penetrate Iranian society, but can it turn that tactical brilliance into strategic success? Israeli and US leadership are telling their public the war is about Iranian strength, but they’re telling themselves it’s about Iranian weakness. There is hubris in thinking tactical and technological prowess can create political change.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

BIG NEWS: World Review is going radio!

Starting this Sunday, at 7:00 a.m. central time, World Review can be heard on Chicago’s NPR station, WBEZ, or on the WBEZ app. We’ll still tape the show on Fridays, and post the video on YouTube and the audio version on Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

Now, on to the show. Today, March 6th, we discussed the ongoing War in Iran, the economic and political shockwave it has caused around the world, and the Pentagon’s ongoing war with. Joining me this week were Nahal Toosi, the Senior Foreign Correspondent at Politico, Anton La Guardia, the Diplomatic Editor at The Economist, and Prashant Rao, the Senior Editor at Semafor.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• As the Iran War enters it second week, the political ends of the conflict remain confused. President Trump has been unclear on what his aims are, while Republicans in Congress seem focused on not calling this a war to avoid having to take a vote. Nahal points out that as the conflict continues, Democrats in Congress will have to coordinate on a response as decisions on funding arise. Prashant points out that the operation itself makes the 2003 Iraq War look well-planned, with a complete lack of aligning current ends with the means to accomplish them. Anton frames the mixed aims of the operation as different people within the administration fighting different wars. Secretary of Defense Hegseth are focused on highlighting lethality, while others arms of governments respond within their own narrow purviews. He also sees some of the unclear aims as deliberate, as Trump likes the flexibility to claim victory and avoid responsibility no matter the outcome. Prashant warns that “federalizing power” in another state, creating a weak center and strengthening other actors, can be dangerous and unpredictable.

• While the Iran War continues, economic and political shockwaves reverberate across the region and the world. Prashant points out that despite the remarkably high interception rate of incoming Iranian attacks, there has been a high cost across the Gulf States. The ways in which cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi have fashioned themselves as global cities has been derailed. Globally, the Straight of Hormuz through which 20% of the world’s oil travels, is closed. Fiscal impacts are already being felt in South Korea and other Asian economies. States that rely on importing finished petroleum products, such as Nigeria, face a looming economic catastrophe. Russian efforts in the Ukraine War are already being buoyed by increased energy sales. War is happening in a concentrated space but reverberating economically, politically, and psychologically across the world.

• Anton argues that one way to see this conflict is as the “Third Gulf War.” Past Gulf Wars ended up as defining moments in American world leadership; The First Gulf War in 1991 defined the U.S. as a hegemon. The Second, in 2003, was the beginning of American decline and involvement in the “forever wars.” This war will likely be epoch defining as well. It may be the beginning of driving a wedge into the “axis of autocracy” or of America getting so bogged down that China and others can rise. For now it, is too soon to tell.

• The Pentagon took aim at Anthropic this week, the only AI firm that had a contract with the Pentagon to work with classified systems. The firm raised issues with some of the ways its tools could be used by the government. Secretary Hegseth and President Trump hit back at the firm, declaring it a supply chain risk. Anton reports that as AI is seeping into all forms of life, it is also seeping into war. U.S. military personnel have indicated that AI has been key to strike planning in the war. He asked whether it may have been used in the strike on a girls school in Iran that killed a reported 175 people. Prashant asserts that standing up to the DoD was a wise move by Anthropic, that they recognize that although the Pentagon budget is large, it is not the whole universe for these companies and mass consumption is much bigger. Nahal argues that we have to ask both “is it ok for the government to be telling a company what to do?” but also, “is it ok for a company to dictate what the government can do?” Already, we’ve seen Elon Musk’s decision to cut off Starlink access to Russian troops impact how wars are being fought. Anton agrees that in an ideal world, Congress would be regulating AI and resolving these disputes. However, the technology may be advancing faster than our dysfunctional political moment can regulate.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Each Friday morning, I host a video podcast called “World Review with Ivo Daalder” where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 27, ahead of the strikes on Iran, we discussed the anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision on Trump’s tariffs, and recent developments in Cuba. Joining me this week were Felicia Schwartz, Diplomatic Correspondent of Politico, Giles Whittell, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of The Observer, and Michael D. Shear, Chief U.K. Correspondent of The New York Times.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Tuesday marked four years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The stalemate is leaving its mark on the country and its people. Giles described a story from Kherson, where a three-year-old went outside for the first time in his life last December. The front line is a drone-patrolled kill zone stretching some 30 kilometers, where movement in daylight can be a death sentence. The numbers are staggering on both sides, with Russia losing roughly 30,000 soldiers a month and Ukraine paying an even higher price relative to its population. The debate in Washington appears far removed from this reality. Felicia notes that the focus is mostly on the negotiations, while the public’s and the President’s attention wanes. Michael notes Europe has the will but not the means to meaningfully support Ukraine, and continues to defer to and rely on Washington in the negotiations. Giles warned that Russia is the closest to having a plan, to keep grinding forward, and to try to weaken NATO, while Europe struggles with its own internal vetoes and unfinished debates over frozen assets. 2026 will be a test for whether Europe can get organized fast enough, otherwise the talk of standing up for Ukraine risks staying just that, talk.

• The Supreme Court decision that Trump cannot use emergency powers to impose tariffs is a direct hit on his favorite instrument of leverage. Michael framed Trump’s worldview as the fusion of money and power, with tariffs functioning less as trade policy than as a club he can swing at allies and adversaries alike. The ruling produced a global exhale, weakening the threat that every disagreement can be met with economic punishment. But the relief is tempered by the obvious reality that Trump is already looking for workarounds, including temporary across-the-board tariffs under other authorities. Giles argued that the judgment creates a moment of choice for everyone else, whether to keep courting Washington or to start pushing back. The UK has so far chosen deference. The bigger question is whether the European Union, with more economic weight, decides this is the opening to get tougher, even as Michael noted that interconnected dependencies, especially on security, make it hard for capitals to tell Trump no in one arena without worrying about retaliation in another. As Felicia noted, while the Supreme Court may have constrained the President’s power, the underlying dynamic remains: the world is still trying to work out how to deal with an American president who treats tariffs as a form of personal power.

• Cuba returned to the conversation through a bizarre incident that felt like it was from another era: a stolen speedboat run from the Florida Keys and ten would-be infiltrators. But the larger story is that the US has long held the conviction that the project in Cuba is ending. The Trump administration continues the pressure campaign with an oil embargo. Felicia argued that Marco Rubio is the key here, given his long-held fixation on transforming Cuba. He now has real authority to try. The administration appears to have departed from the old dream of toppling the system overnight and is instead pursuing regime change light: exerting economic pressure and trying to find a next-generation insider to open the island up for business. The Obama administration tried to change Cuba with carrots and optimism about markets. Trump’s approach is to use sticks to elicit concessions. Whether that strategy will be more effective remains an open question.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 20, we discussed the looming risk of war with Iran, the rapid consolidation of power in Syria as the United States pulls out its troops, and the Trump administration’s increasingly explicit effort to champion far-right politics in Europe. Joining me this week were Liz Sly, Correspondent-at-large of The Washington Post, Bobby Ghosh, journalist and editor for Time, Bloomberg, and CNN, and Matt Kaminski, Editorial Chair of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks and Co-founder of Politico Europe.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Iran feels like a classic game of chicken, except neither side has spelled out what the off-ramp looks like. The administration has assembled the largest naval and air posture in the region since the invasion of Iraq, and as Bobby put it, a gun placed on the mantle in the first act tends to get fired by the third. The temptation for Trump is obvious: he prefers coercion without American boots on the ground, he believes he has already gotten away with limited strikes before, and after a rough political week at home, he has reason to want a distraction or a win. But support for his plans in the region is slim. Liz explained that Gulf states have been quietly drawing red lines, refusing to be used as launch pads and trying to keep themselves out of the blast radius of possible Iranian retaliation. Matt argued that there is more than improvisation here, that parts of the administration see this as one piece of a larger project to remake the Middle East and isolate Tehran, potentially through a strike followed by tighter economic pressure. The problem is that the desired end state is still unclear. Even if the supreme leader were removed, the Revolutionary Guard holds the power, and Liz described the idea that they would calmly bargain their way into a profitable post-revolutionary future as a fantasy. In other words, the United States may be betting that pressure produces pragmatists, while Iran is betting it can wait out until the President’s attention shifts elsewhere.

• In Syria, the new government has managed to consolidate its power significantly. Liz described how Damascus has, for the first time in more than a decade, reasserted control over nearly all Syrian territory, helped by an agreement that integrates the Kurdish-led forces into the Syrian army while allowing local security in a small number of Kurdish majority towns. As US troops withdraw, the biggest near-term risks are familiar: what happens with the detention camps, what happens to escaped militants, and whether ISIS finds the opening it has long been waiting for. While ISIS has failed to consolidate power so far, Matt cautioned that Syria still faces scepticism from neighbouring states in the region, a rising Turkey eager to expand its influence, and an Israel deeply skeptical of the new order. Bobby argued there is more hope now than at any time in years, even if the Kurdish question will not disappear simply because a deal has been signed. If there is a lesson here, it is that the best case is no longer unimaginable, but it is fragile, and the next two months of implementation will tell us whether Syria is becoming a state again or merely entering a new phase of managed instability.

• The Trump administration appears to be increasingly bolstering its support for far-right movements in Europe. Matt captured the mood in Munich, where Marco Rubio received a standing ovation largely because he did not punch Europe in the nose, and because he articulated, in more civilized language, the argument that the Transatlantic alliance still matters for economics, security, and competition with China. But the performance continued after Munich, with Rubio traveling to Slovakia and Hungary and calling Viktor Orbán’s staying in power a vital American interest. Matt called it cognitive dissonance: you cannot claim Europe is essential and then openly meddle in its domestic politics. What the administration may be underestimating is that US support may not actually work in favour of the European far-right. In the UK context, as Liz pointed out, Nigel Farage may be personally close to Trump, but in Europe, association with Trump is often a liability. But Bobby warned that, even though the far-right movement is more aligned with Moscow than Washington, the administration’s actions may still affect tight elections.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 14, coming to you from the Munich Security Conference, we discussed the widening transatlantic divide, the fight over what comes after the American-led global order, and how Ukraine is slipping from the center of the conversation even as the war grinds on. Joining me this week were Karin Axelsson, EU Correspondent of Politiken, Steve Erlanger, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent of The New York Times, and Alexander Ward, National Security Reporter of The Wall Street Journal.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• It has been an eventful weekend in Munich, but despite spending Valentine’s Day together, the relationship between Europe and the US remains fragile. Europeans wanted to hear that Washington still sees the continent as a partner, and Marco Rubio delivered that reassurance in softer language than last year’s speech by JD Vance. But as Karin noted, the underlying ultimatum still came through: do it our way, share our values, or be prepared to stand alone. What made this conference feel more on edge was not just the lingering anger over Greenland, but the way the Trump administration continues to frame the core threat as something inside the relationship rather than outside it, as Alex pointed out. If last year, the conference was about America; this year, it is about Europe and how Europeans will respond to this new reality.

• The bigger debate hovering above everything was whether the rules-based order is gone, and if so, what replaces it. Steve drew a useful distinction between Mark Carney’s language of rupture and Friedrich Merz’s language of rift: one implies a clean break, the other an attempt to repair and create a more resilient alliance. As Karin pointed out, Europeans are trying to salvage the rules-based order, but what an alternative world order could look like remains unclear. For years, American leaders have struggled to make the case that the rules-based order of alliances, trade rules, and institutions matters to ordinary voters. Yet declaring the order dead is its own kind of surrender. If the West vacates the institutions it built, Steve warned, others will fill the vacuum, and Europeans, especially smaller states, have no interest in a world where power alone writes the rules.

• Except for the hour Zelenskyy spent on stage, Ukraine was noticeably absent from the conversations in Munich. Alex noted that Ukraine is being sidelined because no one knows what to do. The key question of how to get Putin to end the war remains unanswered. Steve argued it is starting to feel like the United States is losing interest. Karin suggested that in Europe, the debate over Greenland has crowded out attention on Ukraine, which is fighting for Europe’s security and values in real time through another cold winter. As the war drags on, Zelenskyy’s ability to keep pushing for support wears thin, and audiences shrink.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, February 6, we discussed the talks underway in Oman between the United States and Iran, the latest round of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and Europe’s accelerating push to de-risk from the United States. Joining me this week were Catherine Philp, World Affairs Editor at The Times, Suzanne Lynch, Brussels Bureau Chief of Bloomberg News, and Jamie Dettmer, Opinion Editor and Foreign Affairs Columnist of Politico Europe.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Trump’s armada is steaming toward the Gulf as negotiators meet in Oman, but the basic question remains unsettled: is Washington trying to bargain over the nuclear program, rewrite Iran’s regional posture, or keep the door open to regime change through intimidation? Catherine noted that Tehran’s first small win was procedural, shifting the talks from Istanbul to Oman to keep the agenda tight and centered on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, rather than the laundry list Washington would prefer. Jamie’s point was that the ambiguity is not only between capitals but also within Washington, where parts of the coalition around Trump remain deeply skeptical of another war, even as the President continues his maximal demands. As Suzanne pointed out, without a clear strategy, America’s allies remain concerned about what the President’s plans for a quick win in the region might entail.

• The second round of direct talks between Ukrainians and Russians matters, but it should not be mistaken for a turning point. Jamie reported a notable change in tone: fewer ideological lectures from the Kremlin negotiators, more practical and technical discussions, and different faces at the table. Yet the central question remains: what are Putin’s intentions? Is this a genuine negotiation, or an attempt to buy time while Russia presses its advantage on the battlefield and, above all, in the energy war? The sticking points have not moved. Territory is still the core dispute, and security guarantees remain the political price Kyiv would need to pay to sell any compromise at home, especially amid war weariness increasing and a military that could view concessions as betrayal. Europe is trying to keep Ukraine afloat financially and politically, agreeing on more funding and another sanctions package, but as Suzanne noted, Europeans are still effectively on the outside of the peace talks that would shape their own security. Meanwhile, as temperatures plunge, strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure continue. What I found most notable is the contrast between the three discussions that seem to be taking place simultaneously: The negotiation in Abu Dhabi is about not provoking Trump, the conversation in Brussels is about replacing an American role that has faded, and the conversation in Kyiv is about survival. As Catherine pointed out, as the discussions continue, we are settling into a long war of attrition, accompanied by a diplomatic process that exists mainly to manage one man’s temper.

• Europe is beginning to talk about the United States the way it used to talk about China: as a dependency to be reduced rather than a partner to be trusted. Suzanne argued the mood has changed significantly since the Greenland crisis, especially as President Trump threatened tariffs as punishment for allies who would not line up behind Washington’s position. In response, European leaders have adopted a sharper rhetoric, focused on strategic autonomy, buying European, and digital sovereignty. As Europe seeks to increase its resilience and diversify its markets, a conflict has emerged over tech. European leaders are looking to use their regulatory muscle to limit the power of American tech companies, which the Trump administration is framing as an assault on free speech. As Europe aims to de-risk, Jamie warned that its key challenge is that it is falling behind in the tech and AI race. The old model appears to be failing in three directions at once: cheap Russian energy is gone, open Chinese markets are uncertain, and American security is no longer something Europe can rely on.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Today, January 30, we discussed the growing risk of confrontation with Iran, America's allies turning to China to de-risk from the United States, and how the situation in Venezuela has evolved one month after Maduro was captured. I was traveling this week, and Carla Anne Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the MIA Program at Baruch College’s Marxe School, kindly sat in as host. Joining her this week were Karen DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior National Security Correspondent of The Washington Post, and Philip Stephens, Contributing Editor of The Financial Times.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• While the protests in Iran have calmed down, President Trump’s threats of intervention have not. But as Karen laid out, the administration’s goals remain unclear. Gulf partners are trying to put constraints on Washington, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly refusing access to their airspace for a possible US attack on Iran while urging diplomacy, because they fear they would bear the brunt of retaliation. The split-screen within the administration only deepens the uncertainty. President Trump suggests the armada he has sent to the region is ready to act if Iran does not sign a deal, while Secretary of State Rubio describes it as “preemptively defensive,” a phrase that, as Philip noted, carries echoes of the invasion of Iraq and has raised questions in European capitals. The strategic dilemma is simple and dangerous. If the United States hits first, Iran will almost certainly hit back across the region, and there is no guarantee the exchange ends on Washington’s preferred timetable. If the administration does not act, the question becomes what all this was for, beyond another episode of coercive theater.

• The visits to Beijing by Mark Carney and now Keir Starmer appear to be about more than just trade. Philip argued that Europe has moved, in remarkably little time, from talking about de-risking from China to talking about de-risking from the United States. That shift is beginning to shape decisions that once would have been unthinkable, from trade diversification to a more pragmatic willingness to tolerate some risk in a partnership with China that officials had been trying to reduce. The changed risk calculation in Europe has been accelerated by a puzzle at the heart of Washington’s own posture. The administration’s rhetoric says China is the central challenge, yet its tone and signals often look soft, including the National Defense Strategy released by the Pentagon last week. President Trump appears fixated on his personal relationship with Xi Jinping and unwilling to jeopardize the upcoming summit. European allies hear warnings about getting too close to Beijing, but they also see Washington itself making exceptions and sending mixed messages, which makes hedging feel not only prudent but necessary.

• A month after Maduro was captured, the question of who is running Venezuela remains up for debate. Karen argues there is no evidence the United States has taken control of anything except the oil industry, even as the administration lavishes praise on Delcy Rodríguez and presses for the departure of Iran, Russia, China, and Cuba without a clear enforcement mechanism. The new oil law appears to give American oil companies everything they wanted. Yet, as Philip warned, the investment horizon of major energy firms is measured in decades, and the basic prerequisites of stability and security are still missing. The lack of a clear strategy may risk jeopardizing the President’s declared commercial win for the oil industry. The same pattern shows up in the wider region. The new executive order aimed at choking off oil flows to Cuba is another escalation of pressure without a clear statement of what would satisfy the administration’s interests, beyond vague language about alignment with American priorities.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, January 23, Carla Anne Robbins, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the MIA Program at Baruch College’s Marxe School, filled in for me while I was traveling. She discussed a possible agreement on Greenland, President Trump’s new “Board of Peace” meant to rival the UN, and the state of the global economy. Joining her this week were Stefanie Bolzen, Washington Correspondent of Die Welt, Robbie Gramer, National Security Reporter of The Wall Street Journal, and Prashant Rao, Senior Editor of Semafor.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Discussions on Greenland continued in Davos this week, where President Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed on a framework, but the details of the agreement remain unclear. Robbie argued that the US already had access to most of the elements of a possible deal, including unfettered military access, under the previous defense agreement with Denmark. Nevertheless, the President appears to have backed off his tariff threats against European allies, but the damage is lasting. As Stefanie pointed out, a majority of Europeans now call Trump the enemy of Europe. But the underlying issue remains that Europe does not know how to respond to the President’s threats and lacks a clear plan B.

• Next to Greenland, Europe must also find a response to President Trump’s proposal for a Board of Peace. Originally proposed to resolve the conflict in Gaza, the Trump administration has since tried to broaden it to rival the role of the UN. As Robbie argued, the Board of Peace strikes at a central truth that the UN system is dysfunctional and not fit for the modern age. The administration sees value in disrupting this ineffective system. But so far, the success in getting other countries to sign on seems limited. As Stefanie pointed out, the Board of Peace has not received much traction in Europe, with German officials avoiding commenting on the proposal. Most European countries, except Hungary, have declined the invitation to join.

• Canada was disinvited from the Board of Peace following Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech in Davos and his recent trip to China, during which he discussed a new strategic partnership. Prashant argued that Carney has taken a big risk, given his country’s reliance on trade with the US. But as tensions between the US and China rise, more and more countries are facing a similar difficult choice about whom to align with. What does all this mean for the state of the global economy? Growth has remained surprisingly resilient despite tariffs and persistent political uncertainty. Prashant suggested that part of the answer may be that exporters have absorbed most of the costs, while investment in AI continues to drive growth. But this form of jobless growth and protectionism may not be sustainable, especially as other countries seek new trade partnerships outside the United States.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Yesterday, January 16, we discussed the evolving situation in Iran, the growing transatlantic divide over Greenland and Ukraine, and whether anyone can constrain President Trump on foreign policy. Joining me this week were Yasmeen Abutaleb, Politics Reporter of The Washington Post, Gideon Rachman, Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator of the Financial Times, and Christopher Miller, Chief Ukraine Correspondent of the Financial Times.

While I encourage you to listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• As preparations are underway for President Trump’s meeting with President Zelenskyy in Davos, divisions in the transatlantic relationship are growing over Greenland, raising questions about whether Europe can rely on US security commitments, including in Ukraine. Chris described Kyiv’s strategy as a race to get commitments in writing, hoping in particular for Trump’s commitment to security guarantees. But as Gideon warned, the credibility of such commitments is highly questionable. Without a credible U.S. backstop, the proposed European reassurance force also does not seem to be a viable alternative. What may be motivating the Ukrainians is avoiding further blame for impeding peace, but as Yasmeen pointed out, President Trump continues to reserve the most vicious rhetoric for Zelenskyy. Whether we can actually expect any progress in Davos remains unclear.

• The Iranian crackdown on protests this week was a grim lesson in how quickly a moment of hope can collide with the hard reality of state repression. Gideon argued that the central fact was not the scale of the protests but the regime’s willingness to use massive violence, and that without a split in the security forces, crackdowns can succeed even when the underlying legitimacy crisis deepens. What could have changed the calculus is outside intervention, but President Trump did not deliver on his threats. The external pressure from partners in the region, who were unprepared for retaliation, and the lack of viable military options that could deliver a quick win, likely led the President to walk away. As Yasmeen pointed out, looking at the history of the Arab Spring, even if the President had intervened, regime change cannot guarantee a solution to Iran’s problems. Instead, the government may simply be replaced by a more repressive one. Drawing comparisons to Ukraine, Chris noted that the key to success is organizing and laying the groundwork for a successful transition once the opportunity arises. While the protests may have stopped, the underlying grievances remain and will likely fuel future challenges to the regime.

• All of this leads to the most unsettling question: if Trump can move this fast across so many fronts, who can stop him? Domestically, Yasmeen suggested that Congress has largely surrendered the tools that usually restrain a president, and the courts have not provided a consistent restraint either. Republicans remain unwilling to restrain his authority, which was made clear this week when Senators Hawley and Young flipped and voted against the War Powers Resolution. Until Democrats control one or both chambers of Congress, he remains unbound. Internationally, Gideon noted that Europe’s history of dependence on the US has made European leaders hesitant to push back, only inviting further demands from Trump. As long as Europe is unwilling to entertain the possibility of breaking with America, Trump will continue to do what he wants. Credible pushback appears to be the only language the President respects. Chris noted that Ukraine’s leaders have repeatedly tried to manage Trump through personal persuasion and high-stakes meetings, with mixed results. The real constraint may ultimately come not from appeals to shared values, but from the costs of failure: a collapsed peace process and political consequences at home that reintroduce limits President Trump does not currently feel.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

On Friday, January 9, we discussed the military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, President Trump’s plans for Greenland, and protests erupting in Iran. Joining me this week were Felicia Schwartz, Diplomatic Correspondent of Politico, Bobby Ghosh, journalist and editor who writes for Time, Bloomberg, and CNN, and Yaroslav Trofimov, Chief Foreign-Affairs Correspondent of The Wall Street Journal.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Venezuela may be the most vivid example yet of how this administration pairs shock tactics with a poorly improvised endgame. Felicia called the Maduro operation a “surprising non-surprise,” as the administration had put pressure on the regime for months. Yet the scale of the operation was surprising in its sheer audacity: an overnight raid, an early-morning post from Trump announcing Maduro was en route to New York to face trial, and a press conference declaring the U.S. would now “run” the country. What that looks like remains unclear. Looking at the past, we would expect a call for elections and a plan to handover to the opposition. Instead, as Yaroslav points out, the U.S. appears to want to rule the country by remote control by putting pressure on Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, a strategy reminiscent of the age of empires. This may be particularly challenging given the country’s size, complex geography, and well-armed military and paramilitary groups, as Bobby points out. He expects much greater resistance once Rodríguez has consolidated her power and concluded that the Trump administration is hesitant to put boots on the ground. For now, the White House is trying to turn the raid into a commercial opening for the oil industry. But this may prove more challenging than expected, given oil companies think in decades, not news cycles. As long as the question of what “running” Venezuela actually means remains unanswered, we may not see much progress on the President’s oil agenda either.

• Following his claim of success in Venezuela, the President turned his attention back to Greenland, raising anxiety in European capitals over the future of the NATO alliance. Yaroslav described the threat to Greenland as a form of naked imperialism we haven’t seen in generations, motivated by resources, security, and power projection. But the administration’s motivations do not hold up to reason. Greenland’s resources are largely inaccessible, and as Bobby points out, America has reduced, not expanded, its military presence in Greenland over time because modern defense no longer requires a large number of bases in the Arctic. Despite their questionable arguments, Felicia points out that Washington isn’t treating this as a joke and that European leaders should take these threats seriously. Trump sees this through a real estate lens and has learned he can bully his allies into giving him what he wants. But even in the absence of any actions from the administration, these threats have very real consequences, emboldening Russia and casting doubt on the U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance.

• The President has also threatened to intervene in Iran, where a new wave of protests has sparked a debate over the possibility of regime change. Bobby pointed out that the regime is the weakest it has been in decades, battered strategically after severe blows to its regional proxies, economically strangled by mismanagement and sanctions, and now facing a currency in free fall. But what may make the biggest difference is who is protesting. When bazaaris, the shopkeepers and traders, close their shops and join the protests, it signals a significant change. The last time this constituency moved decisively against the regime, it was the final straw that brought down the Shah. As Yaroslav points out, the regime may be facing a perfect storm, humiliated by previous attacks and under pressure from the Trump administration. Felicia cautioned that U.S. officials inside the administration were unsure what Trump meant by being “locked and loaded.” She suggested the administration may be pulled less by a plan than by pressure from a Republican foreign-policy establishment that remembers the criticism of Obama’s restraint in 2009, and now wants visible support for protesters. But protests only succeed when security forces refuse to shoot, and the Iranian government has spent decades proving it is willing to shoot its own people. This uprising may be different. But even if it is, as Bobby warned, it won’t necessarily end in a neat replay of 1979, with a single figure returning from abroad to “complete” a revolution.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

n this special edition, World Review broadcasts my conversation with NATO Deputy Secretary General, Radmila Šekerinska, at Harvard’s Belfer Center last month. The discussion ranged wide and deep across the state of the alliance, stimulated in great part by probing questions from the student audience.

You can watch or listen to the show.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Thursday, December 18, we discussed the escalation around Venezuela, the most recent round of Ukraine negotiations, and President Trump’s wobbly track record as the chief peacemaker, as claimed. Joining me this week were Nahal Toosi, Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent of Politico, Alex Ward, National Security Reporter of The Wall Street Journal, and Giles Whittell, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of The Observer.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• Venezuela is turning into the purest expression of this administration’s foreign policy style: maximum pressure, maximum ambiguity. The latest step, a blockade targeting Venezuelan oil shipped on sanctioned vessels, comes alongside the largest U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean since 1962. And yet, the administration’s strategy remains ambiguous, ranging from regime change to stopping the flow of drugs and migrants into the US to reclaiming “stolen” oil. Nahal suggested that this may be the point: it enables the administration to declare victory if any of these goals are met. But it’s unclear that the sustained pressure campaign will work and actually lead Maduro to leave, or what the strategy would be if he does. Nobel Peace Prize recipient María Corina Machado may be a potential successor, but Nahal cautioned that views of her inside the administration are mixed. Alex argued that the incoherence was the result of an administration being run by six people over Signal. And the implications may extend well beyond this particular crisis. If the Western Hemisphere truly is becoming the administration’s organizing priority, the show of force in the region may not be temporary, especially in light of reports in the Washington Post about reorganizing the U.S. command structure into three sectors: an Americas Command, Indo-Pacific Command, and an International Command that lumps Europe, Africa, and the Middle East together.

• Ukraine, by contrast, is where the administration insists it is getting close to a deal. Alex argued that the latest talks do show real movement, most notably, a narrowing of differences between the United States and Ukraine on security guarantees, including ideas that would involve Europeans and potentially even a U.S. effort to codify commitments so they aren’t simply the whim of one president. But we are still far away from an actual settlement. Territory remains a key contention that has yet to be resolved, and that the Trump administration has left to the last minute to negotiate. Nahal noted that the administration seems to be profoundly misreading the Russians on this question, treating it as a real estate issue and failing to understand that, for Putin, it is not really about land but about power and restoring the Soviet Union. The administration’s reliance on negotiators with little Russia experience - Witkoff foremost among them - doesn’t help. Meanwhile, Europe is struggling with the financial side of keeping Ukraine afloat, and the debate over the use of frozen Russian assets has become a stress test for allied cohesion. €290 billion remain frozen in Europe, a large share at Euroclear in Brussels, and European leaders remain divided over using those assets to support Ukraine. The absence of a decision may be explained in part by the sustained American pressure and personal threats against the Euroclear Head and Belgian Prime Minister, as Giles points out. The administration’s strategy to focus solely on monetary gains and play the Europeans off against the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainians off against the Russians, seems to make a deal less likely.

• Finally, we turned to President Trump’s favorite subject: his role as the chief peacemaker. But his record appears to be wobbling. Out of the 8 wars the President claims to have resolved in 10 months, several are seeing renewed violence: fighting has returned along the Cambodia-Thailand border, and in the Eastern DRC, the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 is advancing despite the agreement signed in Washington. Trump has his eyes set on the Nobel Peace Prize, but his administration’s efforts seem to fall short of success. Giles argues that while Trump is able to get parties to the table through levers like tariffs, the agreements lack the conventional tools needed for conflict resolution, particularly sustained engagement and enforcement power on the ground. Gaza may be the exception, as Nahal notes, where the administration has put some muscle behind enforcing the ceasefire. The other part of the issue, as Alex notes, is the lack of coordination between leading figures in the Trump administration and staffers in the State Department, Department of Defence, and other agencies, who are left in the dark on most decisions, making it difficult to put the available capabilities into motion to provide enforcement. Allies have adapted to this new decision-making style and prioritize their personal relationship with Trump, sidestepping the usual staff-to-staff exchanges. But the President’s efforts may still be better than the counterfactual, as Nahal notes, many African leaders are appreciative that Trump is showing any attention to conflicts on their continent. The administration’s sprint-like mentality can serve as an important catalyst, but creating lasting peace is a marathon that requires endurance, which the current strategy lacks.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Today, December 12, we discussed the new US National Security Strategy, which was released by the White House last week. Joining me this week were Ken Moriyasu, Washington correspondent of Nikkei Asia, Anna Sauerbrey, foreign editor of Die Zeit, and Anton LaGuardia, diplomatic editor of The Economist.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• The National Security Strategy was announced late last week, dropped with little fanfare, almost as if the White House hoped it would not elicit strong reactions. The document is strikingly short compared to previous strategies. It appears to have been produced quickly, missing key elements, including a conclusion that tells allies and adversaries where the United States thinks the world is headed.

• The language on Europe has triggered the most alarm. As Anna notes, the Europe section reads more like an ideological pamphlet than a security strategy, describing the European Union and other transnational bodies as undermining liberty and the threat of becoming “less European” as a threat to US national security. While commentators and former diplomats described the strategy as a breaking point, the public reaction from government officials has been fairly muted. In part, this may be because the strategy represents a reality that European leaders already know: Europe needs to become more independent. But as Anton described, the strategy may signal that the grace period for the transition of responsibility to European allies may be over sooner than previously expected. The most worrying shift in the strategy is the changed language on Russia. The strategy departs from the NATO Summit Declaration of June of this year and no longer calls Russia a threat, but instead describes the US strategy as seeking strategic stability with Russia. It sends a clear message that the U.S. may be repositioning itself not as Europe’s partner against Russian aggression, but as a mediator in Ukraine and beyond.

• Regarding Asia, the strategy strongly focuses on economic cooperation with China but fails to explicitly mention it in the context of defending Taiwan and the First Island Chain. Ken describes the broader tone as the United States talking to China in China’s own language — echoing Xi Jinping’s strategy of mutual respect, peaceful co-existence, and win-win cooperation. Trump may be trading long-term peaceful coexistence for short-term economic gains, especially in light of his recent decision to allow the sale of more advanced Nvidia semiconductors to China, which he had previously pressured allies not to export. The strategy relies on a “spheres of influence” logic, which China does not seem to be interested in and which contradicts the US’s ambition to remain a Pacific power.

• The strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere to the first priority of American national security. Anton said we may need to learn a new term: a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, a worldview in which American preeminence in the hemisphere is to be reserved and enforced, and where access, leverage, and economic advantage take on a distinctly mercantilist flavor. What’s striking is that, compared to the Europe chapter, reactions in Asia and Europe to this part of the document have been more muted, perhaps because it feels abstract or because it sounds like familiar rhetoric. But it raises a fundamental question that will matter far beyond the Americas: is Trump’s posture in the hemisphere imperial, an assertion of control over geography and critical chokepoints, or isolationist, a narrowing of commitments elsewhere so America can focus on its backyard? The strategy does not provide a clear answer, and we will need to watch how the situation in Venezuela unfolds to see how Trump’s understanding of America First has evolved.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Today, December 5, we discussed the latest on Ukraine, the boat strikes in the Caribbean, and how the Trump Administration sees Europe. Joining me this week were Carla Anne Robbins of the Council on Foreign Relations, Steven Erlanger of The New York Times, and Matthew Kaminski, formerly of Politico.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• It’s been another chaotic week in the quest for peace in Ukraine. Following a weekend of talks in Miami with the Ukrainians, on Monday Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner flew to Moscow for talks with President Putin. They strolled through Moscow, had lunch at a swanky restaurant, and then had to wait for three hours to meet with Putin. The talks went deep into the night—lasting a total of five hours. Despite the ritual claims of “progress” and “productive” meetings, in reality the two US negotiators flew back empty handed. By all accounts, Putin didn’t move an inch on his bottom line—which is that he wants to incorporate territory he has been unable to conquer in 11 years of war into Russia and limit Ukraine’s sovereignty in myriad ways. While Ukrainians are exhausted and want to end the war, they cannot settle for a deal that satisfies Russia. And that’s the problem with these negotiations, Matt argued. Trump seems more interested in a deal—no matter its details—than in negotiations necessary to reach a deal. His aims are mainly self-serving, notably recognition as a peacemaker and helping US business (and the government) making money. Neither of these goals are compatible with a negotiated outcome to the war that both sides can accept. So back-and-forth we go—like a gerbil on a wheel.

• It’s been another week debating the US strikes against boats traversing the Caribbean Sea. Seemingly everyone this week was talking about the strikes on September 2nd against the first boat crossing the Caribbean allegedly carrying large quantities of drugs. The Washington Post reported last week that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered the military to launch a second strike when it appeared the first one had left two survivors. Many call this a war crime. The White House and Pentagon went into damage-limitation mode, predictably pointing fingers to the military rather than taking responsibility themselves. On Thursday, Admiral Frank Bradley, the head of Special Operations Command, testified behind closed on Capitol Hill that the strike he’d authorized was legitimate—even though it is hard to see how two men hanging on to a capsized boat that has just been hit by a missile constitute a threat. But, as Carla argued, the specifics of the case are less important than the strategic vacuum within which the some 20 boat strikes are taking place. What is their purpose? And how can they be legally justified? As worrisome for the future of our security is passing the buck to the US military, which undermines morale in the uniformed military. High ranking people are being fired, scapegoated, or looking for an early exit—weakening the ranks of some of the most experienced and dedicated offers in the military.

• Finally, we turned to politics in Europe—in particular how the Trump administration sees Europe. The White House’s new National Security Strategy, issued this week, argues in no uncertain terms that Europe is declining because it’s “less European.” It speaks of the prospect of “civilizational erasure” and says that on the present course Europe won’t be European in 20 years. To counter this trend, it advocates support for far-right parties who seem to share the christian-nationalist – dare I say white – view of civilization. Steve argued that the strategy makes explicitly what had been clear for a long time, starting with Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich last February. There, the vice president argued that the biggest threat to European security didn’t come from Russia or China, but “from within.” He condemned threats to free speech, warned about judges interfering in democratic processes, and worried about how immigration was undermining European cohesion. Vance and other members of the administration have openly campaigned for far-right candidates in Poland and Germany, and sought to strengthen the far-right in other ways. But, as Steve noted, they may be betting on the wrong horse, for many on the far right not only embrace Putin, they also are generally anti-American.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.

Each week, I host a video podcast called World Review with Ivo Daalder where journalists from major news outlets around the world join me to discuss the latest global news stories of the week.

Today, November 21, we discussed the breaking news on a new US plan to end the war in Ukraine. Joining me this week were Susan Glasser of The New Yorker, James Harding of The Observer, and Peter Spiegel of The Washington Post.

While I encourage you to watch or listen to the episode (and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts!), here are a few interesting things I took away from our discussion:

• On Wednesday, reports emerged of a new US peace plan that would end the war in Ukraine. Drawn up by Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s Peace Envoy, apparently following three days of consultations with Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian envoy, the plan seeks to end the war by giving Russia much of what it wants, Ukraine the promise of a security guarantee, and the United States significant financial benefits. The 28-point plan was officially handed over to President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kiev by Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll on Thursday. On Friday, Vice President JD Vance talked to Zelensky and reportedly told the Ukrainian president to accept the proposal by Thursday, as is, or the US would end all military cooperation with Ukraine. Immediately after the call, Zelensky spoke to the Ukrainian people that the nation faced “very difficult choice: either losing our dignity, or risk losing a key partner.”

• Susan commented that the plan should not be seen as a surprise. It is fully consistent with the views of Donald Trump and JD Vance on the conflict. Both opposed extending military and economic assistance to Ukraine before they were elected. Vance led the opposition to this in the US Senate. During his first term, Trump had told Zelensky’s predecessor, Petro Poroshenko, that Ukraine wasn't a real country because friends of his in Mar-a-Lago had explained that everyone spoke Russian there (sic)! During his campaign in 2024, Trump claimed that the war would never have happened if he’d been president and promised to end it in “one day” after his election. He set out to do that in his first weeks in office by trying to put the squeeze on Ukraine and give Moscow much of what it wanted. The infamous confrontation in the Oval Office in February was an indication of what Trump wanted and how he thought the conflict would end. “You don’t have the cards,” he told Zelensky. The 28-point plan reflects the president’s view that he can force Zelensky to accept a deal that would give Russia territory it doesn’t even occupy, limit the scope of Ukraine’s army and capabilities after the war, and even impose a new security order on the rest of Europe. But none of this, Susan noted, should be a surprise.

• How has the rest of the world reacted to the plan and the push for a quick acceptance by Ukraine? European leaders were completely caught off guard. There had been no consultation, and the plan leaked even before many had seen it. The leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and the EU reached out to Zelensky to give Ukraine its full support. “Nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine,” they solemnly declared. But there was silence on what they would do. James reported that European leaders saw the plan as a capitulation—and unacceptable. He suggested that the choice for Europe was either Witkoff or the West. If the plan were to die a slow death, that would mean Witkoff’s influence would start to wane, perhaps replaced by people with a deeper background in diplomacy and history. But if the plan stands, that would effectively mean the end of the West. The idea of the West is built around the inviolability of sovereignty, which the United States was seeking to deny for Ukraine by forcing it to accept Russia’s forceful dismantlement of its country and limits on how to ensure its own security. It is also built on the idea that security within the West is indivisible—that a threat against one is a threat against all. Yet, the US plan, which distinguished between NATO and the United States (as if the US isn’t a founding and leading member of NATO), effectively called Washington’s commitment to alliances into question. Walking away from Ukraine would make it difficult, if not possible, for Poland or the Baltic states to believe that the United States would defend them if attacked.

• Given all these negative implications, why push the plan now? Peter wondered whether political weakness — of both Trump and Zelensky — might be part of the explanation. Trump needs a win, and the biggest foreign policy win that has eluded him so far is ending the war in Ukraine that he had promised to end in one day. Trump has been weakened by the election losses earlier this month, his caving to Congress on the Epstein files, and an economic situation that is beginning to eat into his popularity (as indicated by the polls). Zelensky, meanwhile, is facing the biggest corruption scandal of his administration. Not only does the scandal implicate people close to him, but it involves the misuse of monies that were to be used to defend the energy infrastructure Ukrainians need to keep the lights on and heat going through a cold winter. Clearly, the White House thought this was an opportune time to press Ukraine to agree to a deal. That may well have been a miscalculation, however. The last thing Zelensky can afford is a political debate over the future of Ukraine, which under this plan, would be dire indeed. If anything, his negotiating room has been reduced rather than increased. And if the US pressed too hard and Zelensky were forced to step down, the person taking his place would be far more likely to take a harder line on peace than Zelensky has so far.

• All of which means that the issue bears watching in the days and weeks ahead.

Those are my quick takes on this week’s episode here on World Review. To get the full story, please listen to the episode itself.